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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The State has filed two separate opening briefs, one prior to remand and one 
following remand. Solomon Ford will cite to the first brief with "First Br." and the 
second brief with "Second Br." 
I. Issues Presented in the State's First Opening Brief 
Mr. Ford disputes the State's characterization of the issues in the first brief. 
Mr. Ford will therefore restate the issues after providing some context. 
Mr. Ford served 13 years of a 15-year sentence after being convicted of possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. (R. 52, 340.) Specifically, while Mr. Ford 
was paroled, officers found (i) a handgun holster in an apartment next door to where 
Mr. Ford's girlfriend lived and (ii) parts of a shotgun, but not a barrel—insufficient parts 
to permit its use as a weapon—in a gym bag in his girlfriend's apartment.1 
In 1999, Mr. Ford—acting pro se—unsuccessfully attempted to raise the 
constitutional issue that his conviction is void because he was denied a preliminary 
hearing by a magistrate as required by article I, section 13. (R. 294:4, 15.) Judge Medley 
construed his 1999 petition as raising a separate issue concerning only the 
unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority and denied the petition as procedurally 
barred under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). (First Br. at 4.) 
In 2005, Mr. Ford—still acting pro se—filed the current petition with the district 
court raising his article I, section 13 argument, which the district court recognized as 
1
 If the Court concludes that the record of Mr. Ford's original trial becomes relevant to 
this appeal, Mr. Ford can supply a copy of that transcript. 
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such. (R. 4, 147.) In the first opening brief, the State construes Mr. Ford's petition as 
raising merely an unconstitutional delegation argument—the issue Judge Medley ruled he 
was procedurally barred from considering in 1999—and contends that this argument is 
procedurally barred under the PCRA. While Mr. Ford does raise an unconstitutional 
delegation argument under article V, section 1, and article VIII, section 1, Mr. Ford's 
primary argument is that a magistrate did not preside over his preliminary hearing, as 
constitutionally required under article I, section 13,4 an entirely separate constitutional 
violation. Until the district court addressed the article I, section 13 issue in this 
proceeding, it had never before been recognized in any of Mr. Ford's petitions. 
Issue 1: Whether the article I, section 13 right to a preliminary hearing by 
magistrate—a substitute for the ancient right to indictment by grand jury—requires that a 
member of the judicial branch determine whether probable cause exists. 
Issue 2: Whether the Utah Constitution permits the legislature to delegate 
authority to conduct preliminary hearings to someone not a member of the judicial 
branch. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews interpretations of the Utah Constitution 
for correctness. Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, ^ 6, 52 P.3d 1148. 
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed 
or permitted." Utah Const, art. V, § 1. 
"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as a district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature 
by statute may establish." Utah Const, art. VIII, §1. 
4
 "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate." Utah Const, art I, § 13. 
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II. Issues Raised in the State's Second Opening Brief 
For the most part, Mr. Ford agrees with the State's framing of the three right to 
counsel issues presented in the second opening brief, but not one of the standards of 
review. The State correctly notes that all three issues concern very narrow circumstances 
in which (i) a district court has granted a habeas petition (or petition for post-conviction 
relief); (ii) in granting the petition, the court has vacated the legal basis of confinement; 
and (iii) the State has decided to appeal the district court's ruling. (Second Br. at 2.) 
The State construes the scope of the statutory right to counsel as co-extensive with 
the federal constitutional right to counsel. Mr. Ford therefore will address the scope of 
the constitutional rights to counsel before addressing the statutory right to counsel. 
Issue 3: Whether the rights to counsel and to due process under the United States 
Constitution require that individual states must provide counsel to the indigent when a 
state employs the judicial process to alter the status quo and to acquire the legal basis to 
imprison an indigent individual. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews interpretations of the United States 
Constitution for correctness. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
Issue 4: Whether the district court abused its discretion by appointing counsel 
under the Utah Constitution where the State is employing the judicial process to alter the 
status quo and to acquire the legal basis to imprison an indigent individual. 
Standard of Review: The question of whether to appoint counsel under article I, 
section 12 is "left to the discretion of the trial judge, with his action subject to review for 
abuse of discretion." State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971). 
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Issue 5: Whether the Indigent Defense Act requires the State to provide counsel 
to the indigent when the State employs the judicial process to alter the status quo and to 
acquire the legal basis to imprison an indigent. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews interpretations of statutes for 
correctness. MacFarlane v. State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, f9, 134 P.3d 1116. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 5 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case 
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it. 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel . . . . In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 13: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted 
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. 
Utah Constitution, article V, section 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
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Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 1: 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court 
of general jurisdiction known as a district court, and in such other courts as the 
Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and 
other such courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts of record 
shall also be established by statute. 
Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 3: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary 
for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination 
of any cause. 
Amendment VI to the United States Constitution 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shal l . . . have the Assistance of counsel 
for his defense. 
Amendment XIV to the United States Constitution 
No State shal l . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. 
6471U2 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the State's imprisonment of a man for 13 years without first 
affording him his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, a right 
enshrined in article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution. Mr. Ford's hearing was 
conducted by a court commissioner, someone the State concedes had no authority to 
exercise judicial powers. The underlying basis for Mr. Ford's conviction is thin 
enough—possession of a dangerous weapon, where no functional weapon was ever 
found, let alone produced as evidence—to make the denial of this right significant. As 
the State recognizes, absent an article I, section 13 preliminary hearing, the original trial 
court could not have obtained subject matter jurisdiction. This Court has inherent 
authority under article VIII, section 3, and the habeas corpus provision of article I, 
section 5, to address the merits of a petition challenging subject matter jurisdiction. 
This case also presents the question of whether the State has an obligation to 
provide paid legal counsel to an indigent person when the State employs the judicial 
process to obtain the legal authority to imprison that person. After the district court 
granted Mr. Ford's habeas petition and vacated his sentence, the State had two avenues 
for dealing with Mr. Ford. First, it could have accepted the district court's proffered 
opportunity to re-try Mr. Ford, if it could first establish probable cause in a preliminary 
hearing before a magistrate. (R. 240.) Second, the State could have dropped the case 
because Mr. Ford had already spent 13 (of a possible 15) years in prison for possession of 
a weapon. The State chose to pursue a third route—to prosecute this appeal and to seek 
the authority to send Mr. Ford, who is now free, back to prison. 
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II. Course of Proceedings 
On June 3, 2005, Mr. Ford—acting pro se—filed a pleading he titled "Relief From 
a Void Judgment and Order Rule 60(b)(4)." (R. 1.) The district court and the State 
construed this pleading as a petition to vacate his conviction on the ground that the 
original trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 40, 144.) 
On October 19, 2005, the State moved to dismiss the petition because it was 
procedurally barred under the under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code 
sections 78-35a-101, et seq. (R. 43-48.) Mr. Ford represented himself in opposing the 
motion. (R. 34.) On January 9, 2006, the district court held a hearing on the motion, 
after which it ordered the State to address the merits of the petition. (R. 101, 294:16-17.) 
In its memorandum addressing the merits, the State argued that the commissioner 
presiding over Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing had de facto judicial authority and was 
authorized by the legislature to conduct such hearings. (R. 102-113.) Mr. Ford—again 
acting pro se—responded by arguing that because a member of the judicial branch did not 
conduct the preliminary hearing, his conviction is void, and this argument cannot be 
procedurally barred because it concerns subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 122-26.) 
On April 25, 2006, the district court granted Mr. Ford's petition. (R. 144.) In its 
decision, the district court first addressed the jurisdictional question in the context of 
article I, section 13's requirement that a magistrate conduct the preliminary hearing. (R. 
147.) The district court recognized that the Judicial Council had not authorized 
commissioners to conduct preliminary hearings. (R. 148.) The court then rejected the 
State's argument that this problem could be overcome with the doctrines of de facto 
authority and waiver, concluding that the failure to provide an article I, section 13 hearing 
6471112 7 
by a judicial officer precluded the original trial court from obtaining subject matter 
jurisdiction, a defect not subject to waiver under the PCRA.5 (R. 150-51.) 
After granting the petition, the district court appointed counsel from the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association ("SLDA") to represent Mr. Ford and to address whether 
Mr. Ford was entitled only to a new trial or to immediate release. (R. 152.) On June 21, 
2006, the district court—assuming the State would not find 13 years sufficient 
punishment for possession of a dangerous weapon—ordered the State either (i) to provide 
Mr. Ford a preliminary hearing and new trial or (ii) to release him immediately. (R. 240.) 
On June 26, 2006, the State sought a third option by filing a motion to stay the district 
court's judgment pending appeal. (R. 246.) On August 1, 2006, the district court denied 
the motion to stay. (R. 277.) The State then unsuccessfully sought to have this Court 
stay the judgment. (R. 280.) On August 15, 2006, the district court ordered Mr. Ford 
released from prison. (R. 284.) On July 10, 2006, the State filed a notice of appeal, 
which is deemed to have been filed on August 15, 2006, when the final judgment was 
entered. (R. 255.) 
After the State filed its first opening brief, this Court remanded the case so that 
SLDA could withdraw as counsel for Mr. Ford due to a conflict of interest. (R. 295-96.) 
On February 26, 2007, the district court appointed Jennifer Gowans and Randall Spencer 
5
 While it is somewhat difficult to separate the district court's article I, section 13 analysis 
from its unconstitutional delegation analysis, this confusion is irrelevant. (First Br. at 
16.) "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it 
is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or 
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed 
on by the lower court." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1[10, 52 P.3d 1158 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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to represent Mr. Ford. (R. 303.) On March 2, 2007, Mr. Ford moved to have his current 
counsel substituted for SLDA (which had already withdrawn) or for Ms. Gowans and 
Mr. Spencer (who had not yet entered an appearance). (R. 305.) On March 12, 2007, 
Mr. Ford moved the district court to appoint his new counsel as paid counsel under the 
Indigent Defense Act ("IDA"), the Utah Constitution, and the United States Constitution. 
(R. 319.) On March 19, 2007, the district court entered an order approving the 
appointment of Mr. Ford's current counsel after the State had stipulated to the 
appointment, leaving only a dispute concerning whether the appointment should be pro 
bono or paid. (R. 339.) 
Mr. Ford then notified Salt Lake County that he was seeking appointment of paid 
counsel by sending it courtesy copies of all the relevant pleadings. (R. 393.) In support 
of his motion, Mr. Ford filed affidavits demonstrating his continued indigency. (R. 340.) 
Mr. Ford explained in his affidavit that he had been working at Kimball Equipment 
Company in Salt Lake City since the time he was released from prison, but his $1,740 
monthly income leaves only $208 in discretionary income each month, after taxes, living 
expenses, and child support for Mr. Ford's son are deducted. (R. 341, 416.) Mr. Ford 
then filed the affidavit of Tawni J. Anderson Sherman, who testified that defending 
against the State's appeal would cost between $15,000 and $45,000. (R. 389, 416.) 
On May 31, 2007, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Ford's motion to appoint 
paid counsel. (R. 413). After the hearing, the district court granted Mr. Ford's motion 
and directed counsel for Mr. Ford to provide a copy of its order to the County. (R. 413.) 
The district court specifically found—based upon evidence in the written record and 
representations of Mr. Ford's counsel at the hearing—that the County had been notified 
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of the hearing, as required under the IDA. (R. 417.) The district court then ruled that 
Mr. Ford is entitled to paid counsel under the IDA, the Utah Constitution, and the United 
States Constitution. (R. 417-423.) 
On June 28, 2007, the State appealed the district court's order appointing paid 
counsel. (R. 427.) This Court consolidated both of the State's appeals. 
III. Statement of Facts 
On August 19, 1993, the State charged Mr. Ford by information with possession of 
a dangerous weapon and aggravated assault. (R.144) Mr. Ford promptly invoked his 
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, and on September 9, 1993, a circuit court 
commissioner, Frances Palacios, who was not a member of the judicial branch, bound 
Mr. Ford over for trial. (R.10.) Mr. Ford was acquitted on the assault charge, but was 
convicted on the weapon charge. (R. 52.) Mr. Ford served 13 years before being 
released in August 2006. (R. 284.) 
6471112 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the first opening brief, filed before the remand, the State argues that Mr. Ford's 
jurisdictional claims were procedurally barred by the legislature when it enacted the 
PCRA. This is incorrect. This Court has inherent constitutional powers under article 
VIII, section 3 and the habeas corpus provision in article I, section 5, to consider the 
merits of a collateral attack on an original trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.6 
On the merits, the State makes two concessions that demonstrate the original trial 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. First, the State concedes that an article I, section 
13 preliminary hearing is a constitutional prerequisite for a trial court to obtain subject 
matter jurisdiction over a criminal matter. (First Br. at 22-23.) Second, the State 
concedes that the circuit court commissioner who presided over Mr. Ford's preliminary 
hearing was not a judicial officer. (First Br. at 17, 19, 21.) The State attempts to escape 
the conclusion that the original trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction by asserting 
that a preliminary hearing need not be conducted by a member of the judicial branch. 
The State's assertion is incorrect. 
The Magna Carta enshrined the requirement that before citizens can be forced to 
endure a felony trial, the prosecuting executive must show an independent judicial 
body—the grand jury—that probable cause exists to believe the crime was committed. In 
the late nineteenth century, states began experimenting with a substitute to the use of 
grand juries in felony cases by permitting the showing of probable cause to be made at a 
preliminary hearing before a judicial officer instead of a full grand jury. This right to 
6
 Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 87, 448 P.2d 907 (1968); Thompson v. Harris, 106 
Utah 32, 40, 144 P.2d 761 (1943). 
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preliminary hearings made is way into article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution, as 
did the requirement that such hearing be conducted by a member of the judiciary. Article 
I, section 13 uses the term "magistrate," a word defined as one with the authority to 
exercise judicial powers. State v. Mclntrye, 92 Utah 177, 183; 66 P.3d 879, 882 (Utah 
1937). Early case law establishes this definition, and no recent case law calls it into 
question. The State's assertion that any "lawyer with criminal law experience" may 
preside over a preliminary hearing is without historical support. Under the Utah 
Constitution, the hearing must be conducted by a member of the judiciary, something that 
did not happen in Mr. Ford's case. Therefore, the original trial court never obtained 
jurisdiction to try Mr. Ford. 
Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing contained an additional constitutional defect—the 
legislature made an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers to a non-judicial 
officer in authorizing, by statute, the commissioner to preside over Mr. Ford's 
preliminary hearing. The State contends that magistrates do not exercise judicial 
authority because they do not enter final judgments and that, even if did exercise judicial 
authority, the commissioner had de facto judicial authority when acting as a magistrate. 
Both arguments fail. First, magistrates do enter final judgments—when they dismiss an 
information—and therefore, under the State's criteria, they exercise judicial power. 
Second, under the de facto authority doctrine the first citizen to raise the separation of 
powers violation—in this case Mr. Ford—can benefit from the violation. Therefore, 
Mr. Ford is entitled to be released. The Court may affirm on this independent basis. 
In the State's second opening brief, it argues that the trial court erred in ruling that 
Mr. Ford has a right to paid counsel under the Indigent Defense Act, the Utah 
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Constitution, and the United States Constitution. The State's argument is premised 
entirely upon the distinction between civil proceedings and criminal proceedings, and the 
assertion that post-conviction proceedings are civil. As Mr. Ford pointed out in the trial 
court, this distinction cannot carry the weight the State would place on it. The right to 
counsel sometimes does attach in "civil" proceedings, namely juvenile "criminal" cases, 
parental rights termination cases, and parole revocation hearings. And the right to 
counsel sometimes does not attach in "criminal" proceedings, namely where a defendant 
files a discretionary appeal after his sentence is affirmed in an appeal of right. The 
distinction relevant to the question of the entitlement to paid counsel that these cases 
reveal is whether the State is attempting to deprive a citizen of a fundamental right, such 
as liberty. When such a deprivation is the probable consequence of the State's 
proceeding against a party, the party is entitled to paid counsel. 
This is reflected in Utah law recognizing there is a right to counsel for probation 
(and parole) revocation hearings, but no such right to counsel in parole grant hearings, 
where prisoners have already lost their liberty. It is also reflected in federal law 
recognizing the right to counsel to defend against a state's discretionary appeal after a 
defendant's successful appeal of right granting relief, but no right to counsel for a 
defendant to prosecute a discretionary appeal after an unsuccessful appeal of right. The 
key is whether the State is attempting to upset the legal status quo by obtaining the right 
to deprive a citizen of a fundamental liberty interest. 
Here, the State is attempting to send Mr. Ford back to prison, where he already 
spent 13 years for a conviction for gun possession. Therefore, to defend against the 
State's appeal, Mr. Ford has the right to paid counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ford spent 13 years in prison after being convicted of possessing a dangerous 
weapon, even though the State never complied with the constitutional prerequisite for 
filing the information—that the charge be submitted for "examination and commitment 
by a magistrate." Utah Const, art. I, § 13. Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was instead 
conducted by a commissioner who had no judicial authority. As the State notes, if 
Mr. Ford was denied this constitutional right, then "the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to try him under the existing precedent." (First Br. at 23.) In the first 
opening brief, the State makes two arguments to avoid this result: (i) the PCRA prevents 
the Court from considering the merits of Mr. Ford's petition and (ii) the language in 
article I, section 13 requiring examination and commitment by "a magistrate" does not 
refer to a member of the judicial branch. Both arguments fail. 
First, this Court's review of Mr. Ford's petition derives not from the PCRA, but 
from its inherent constitutional powers under article Villi, section 3, and the habeas 
corpus provision in article I, section 5. Utah law has always recognized that (i) the 
judiciary has constitutional authority to vacate a conviction and sentence in the interest of 
justice and (ii) the "interests of justice" includes circumstances in which the original trial 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The passage of 13 years that Mr. Ford spent in 
prison only heightens the injustice; it does not, as the State argues, cure the violation 
under a legislatively created rule of procedure. 
7
 In fact, if Mr. Ford's conviction is reinstated, his conviction would provide a basis for 
federal prosecution of a parole violation. Without the conviction, like the State, federal 
prosecutors would have to prove that Mr. Ford possessed a dangerous weapon. 
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Second, the history of article I, section 13 demonstrates that preliminary hearings 
must be conducted by a member of the independent judiciary, not anyone who happens to 
be a "lawyer with criminal law experience," as the State repeatedly suggests. (First Br. at 
29.) As demonstrated below, Mr. Ford was denied his right to the preliminary hearing 
required by article I, section 13, a prerequisite to the executive branch having authority to 
prosecute and to the trial court obtaining subject matter jurisdiction. The district court 
was correct to vacate Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence. 
Finally, after the district court vacated Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence and 
released him, the State decided that it wanted Mr. Ford to serve more than the 13 years he 
had already spent in prison for possession of a dangerous weapon, but it did not want to 
provide Mr. Ford a proper preliminary hearing and new trial. The State instead attempts 
to achieve the same legal result—gaining authority to deprive Mr. Ford of his liberty and 
send him back to prison—by filing this appeal. Had the State chose to re-try Mr. Ford, he 
undisputedly would have had the right to counsel. As demonstrated below, this right to 
counsel cannot be extinguished simply because the State has chosen to deprive Mr. Ford 
of the same liberty though the appellate courts instead of the trial court. 
I. Mr. Ford's Claims Are Not Procedurally Barred; Therefore, the Court 
Should Address the Merits of Mr. Ford's Petition 
In the first opening brief, the State assumes that the procedural bars described in 
the Post-Conviction Relief Act restrict this Court's authority to reach the merits of 
Mr. Ford's petition. As described below, this assumption is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, as the State now recognizes in its second opening brief: "The Utah Supreme Court 
has concluded that the judicial branch has state constitutional authority for post-
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conviction review of a criminal conviction under Art I, § 5 and Art. VIII." (Second Br. at 
30.) Therefore, this Court should review the petition pursuant to its constitutional 
authority, not the PCRA. Second, even ignoring the Court's constitutional powers, the 
State's procedural bar arguments under the PCRA do not apply to Mr. Ford's claims 
because Mr. Ford has good cause for failing to raise them previously. For both reasons, 
the Court should address the merits. 
A. The Court Has Inherent Constitutional Authority to Review the Merits 
of Mr. Ford's Petition 
The Court has the constitutional authority under article VII, section 3, and article I, 
section 5, to review the merits of Mr. Ford's petition. Article I, section 5 provides that 
"[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it." Utah Const. Art. I, § 5. Neither 
statutes nor rules of procedure can diminish this Court's inherent constitutional authority, 
except where another constitutional provision expressly authorizes such interference, 
something absent here. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1998) ("the legislature 
may not impose restrictions which limit the writ as a judicial rule of procedure, except as 
provided in the constitution"); State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f7 n.4, 127 P.3d 682 
(recognizing that Rule 65B cannot "diminish the availability of extraordinary relief). 
A statute, such as the PCRA, could not deprive the judicial branch of this 
constitutional authority. At the time Utah became a state, courts routinely reviewed 
criminal convictions in habeas petitions, especially when they involved jurisdictional 
challenges. This point is demonstrated by a case strikingly similar to this one decided by 
the United States Supreme Court in 1884. In Ex parte Wilson, the Court granted a habeas 
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petition where "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is 
an infamous crime, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution; and 
the District Court, in holding the petitioner to answer for such a crime, and sentencing 
him to such imprisonment, without indictment or presentment by a grand jury, exceeded 
its jurisdiction, and he is therefore entitled to be discharged." 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1884) 
(emphasis added). In other words, constitutional checks on prosecutorial discretion are 
sufficiently important that the failure to comply with them not only precludes subject 
matter jurisdiction but also permits a court to vacate a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt verdict 
on habeas review. 
Utah law is in accord. In 1875, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah 
released a prisoner on habeas corpus because the Justice of the Peace did not have 
jurisdiction to arrest. Ex parte Dixon, 1 Utah 192, 193 (1875). Jurisdiction was lacking 
because service of the summons was defective, which rendered the judgment "void." Id 
After Utah became a state, the rule was no different. Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 
361, 93 P. 988, 994 (1908) (recognizing that "on habeas corpus proceedings," if a court 
determines that "there was no preliminary examination or hearing by the magistrate, the 
accused should be discharged"). 
Here, Mr. Ford's petition claims that the original trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction and therefore his conviction and sentence are "a nullity and void." (R. 5.) 
This places Mr. Ford's petition squarely within the historical scope of the Court's 
constitutional authority.8 Areson v. Pincock, 220 P. 503, 504 (Utah 1923) ("Habeas 
8
 The fact that the district court was led to construe the petition as falling under the PCRA 
and Rule 65C, instead of article I, section 5, is irrelevant. (R. 151.) Appellate courts are 
not bound by how a petition is characterized—either by the parties or a lower court—but 
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corpus takes cognizance only of defects of a jurisdictional character, which render the 
proceedings not merely voidable; but absolutely void."). As the Utah Supreme Court has 
explained, "a writ of habeas corpus was classically used to challenge the lawfulness of a 
physical restraint under which a person was held or the jurisdiction and sentence of a 
court that convicted a person," and provides "a post-conviction remedy in unusual 
circumstances to determine whether a person was convicted in violation of principles of 
fundamental fairness or whether the sentence imposed is void." Renn v. Utah State Bd. 
of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681-82 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, this Court may 
adjudicate the merits of Mr. Ford's petition because it demonstrates that his original trial 
court "had no jurisdiction over the person or the offense." Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 
96, 98, 440 P.2d 968 (1968); see also Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 40, 144 P.2d 761 
(1943). 
The lack of jurisdiction precludes all procedural bars. As the Utah Supreme Court 
has explained, even where a jurisdictional claim could have and should have been raised 
previously, a conviction "can be subjected to collateral attack . . . when the interests of 
justice so demand because of some extraordinary circumstances or exigency: e.g., lack of 
jurisdiction." Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 87,448 P.2d 907 (1968) (emphasis 
added). The Court has recognized the constitutional authority to review post-conviction 
petitions extends even to cases in which there has been no showing of prejudice. 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81; ffi[61, 62,150 P.3d 480 (holding that relief under Rule 
60(b) was appropriate despite statutory bars because a "post-conviction proceeding is a 
look "to the substance of the action and the nature of the relief sought in determining the 
true nature of the extraordinary relief requested." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995). 
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proceeding of constitutional importance, over which the judiciary has supervisory 
responsibilities due to our constitutional role"). In short, this Court has the constitutional 
authority to review the merits of Mr. Ford's petition.9 
B. The State's Procedural Bar Argument Fails Because Judge Medley Did 
Not Construe the Third Petition As Raising a Jurisdictional Claim 
The State's procedural bar argument under the PCRA fails for another reason. 
The State's primary procedural argument is that Mr. Ford's claims in his current petition 
are barred because they were raised in Mr. Ford's earlier third petition. This is not so. 
As the district court recognized, in adjudicating the third petition (on procedural 
grounds) Judge Medley expressly construed the pro se petition as not raising a 
jurisdictional challenge: "Petitioner's challenge to the court commissioner's authority to 
preside at his preliminary hearing does not state a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction to 
try petitioner." (R. 54-55, 151 (emphasis added).) The State's briefs in the district court 
confirm this. When addressing the merits of the current petition, the State characterized 
Judge Medley's previous order as follows: the third petition's "challenge to the court 
commissioner's authority to preside at his preliminary hearing did not state a challenge to 
the court's jurisdiction to try petitioner; therefore, the claim was procedurally barred." 
(R. 45.) According to the State, only in "subsequent pleadings"—meaning the petition at 
9
 In its first brief, the State repeatedly cites State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, 147 P.3d 448, 
for the proposition that the district court should not have relied on its own reasoning in 
resolving the petition. Robison does not mention a district court's authority to reason its 
way to a just conclusion, but instead only cautions appellate courts reviewing district 
court decisions not to reverse on alternative grounds which have not been briefed by the 
parties. Importantly, the court states, "other than for jurisdictional reasons the court of 
appeals should not normally search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to 
reverse a district court judgment." Id. at |^22 (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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issue in this appeal—did Mr. Ford claim that "the alleged defect is jurisdictional." (R. 
47.) 
Even assuming Judge Medley had considered Mr. Ford's third petition as raising a 
jurisdictional challenge, the challenge stemmed from an unconstitutional delegation, not a 
violation of article I, section 13. In the district court, the State recognized both (i) that the 
third petition presented only an argument concerning "an unconstitutional delegation of 
judicial authority" and (ii) that Mr. Ford's current article I, section 13 claim was not 
raised in the third petition: Mr. "Ford did not include his present claim in this third 
petition." (R. 45, 107.) 
The State also argued below that the issue concerning whether "the commissioner 
lacked authority to preside at his preliminary hearing because allowing her to do so was 
an unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function" had been raised by Mr. Ford 
cTf|or the first time in his Opposition Memorandum." (R. 130 (emphasis added).) The 
State went so far as to argue that Mr. Ford had to "amend his petition" before the district 
court could consider the unconstitutional delegation claim. (R. 130.) If the 
unconstitutional delegation claim was raised for the first time in the opposition 
memorandum, then it could not be identical to any of the claims originally raised in the 
petition, including the article I, section 13 claim. Importantly, it is not the article I, 
section 13 claim, but what the State construed as the "newly raised" unconstitutional 
delegation claim, that the State asserts is "the identical claim that Ford litigated and lost 
in his third petition." (R. 130 & n. 3.) 
Mr. Ford disputes that Judge Medley adjudicated any jurisdictional claims. 
However, insofar as this Court concludes that Judge Medley did implicitly address a 
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jurisdictional challenge when he ruled the petition was procedurally barred, and that, this 
Court then implicitly ruled on the same issue, these conclusions would have the potential 
to affect only Mr. Ford's unconstitutional delegation claim, not his article I, section 13 
claim, and not to preclude addressing the merits of the claim: "Protection of life and 
liberty from unconstitutional procedures is of greater importance than is res judicata.5'10 
Hurst v.Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035, 1036 (Utah 1989) ("a procedural default is not 
always determinative of a collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial 
was not conducted . . . in harmony with constitution standards"). 
Utah's common law exceptions to procedural bars survive enactment of the 
PCRA. Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, ^|21, 151 P.3d 968. Under the common law, 
courts could reach the merits of successive petitions otherwise procedurally barred upon a 
showing of good cause. Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1990) (providing a 
non-exhaustive list of what constitutes good cause or unusual circumstances). And good 
cause exists here because (as demonstrated in section III of this brief), after Mr. Ford's 
third petition was dismissed as procedurally barred, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the 
scope of the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation in Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & 
Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d 283, a clarification that now makes clear that the 
10
 The State argues that "Ford was not entitled to raise the jurisdictional challenge in 
successive petitions until he found a post-conviction court that agreed with him. (First 
Br. at 11.) In fact, this is precisely what the writ of habeas corpus entitles a prisoner to 
do: "By the common law of England it is the right of any imprisoned person to apply 
successively to every tribunal competent to issue a writ of habeas corpus, and each 
tribunal must determine such an application upon its merits unfettered by the decision of 
any other tribunal of coordinate jurisdiction, even if the grounds urged are exactly the 
same." Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 n.4 (Utah 1989) (quoting Eshugbavi Eleko v. 
Nigeria [1928] AC (Eng) 459- PC. Rex v. Gee Dew (1924) 33 BC 524, [1924] 3 DLR 
153.) 
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legislature's delegation of judicial power to court commissioners violates article V, 
section 1 and article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Thus, the "ends of justice 
would be served" by addressing the merits here. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037. 
Mr. Ford could not have anticipated the court's clarification of this doctrine when 
he filed his prose third petition, and it would be fundamentally unfair to preclude review 
of the merits of any of his claims, all of which raise serious constitutional violations that 
deserve resolution on the merits. As the Utah Supreme Court recently recognized, "no 
statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition," as "proper 
consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas petition will always be in the 
interests of justice." Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1998). The Court should 
address the merits. 
II. Mr. Ford Was Denied His Right to Preliminary Hearing Under Article I, 
Section 13, and Therefore, the Original Trial Court Never Obtained Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction to Try Mr. Ford for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon 
Under article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution, Mr. Ford was entitled to a 
preliminary hearing before a "magistrate." The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
the Utah Constitution does not provide prosecutors unfettered discretion. The court has 
noted that "courts have had occasion to scrutinize the exercise of the broad discretion 
accorded prosecutors, and that scrutiny has revealed that the prosecutor's good faith is a 
fragile protection for the accused." State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). A 
preliminary hearing by a magistrate provides a check on such abuses. 
As the original definition of the word "magistrate" demonstrates, a preliminary 
hearing must be conducted by a member of the judicial branch, something the State 
concedes did not occur in Mr. Ford's case. Therefore, the prosecutor did not have the 
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authority to bring Mr. Ford to trial and the original trial court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to try Mr. Ford. As the district court has correctly concluded, Mr. Ford's 
conviction and sentence are void. 
In the first opening brief, the State does not deny either that a preliminary hearing 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a trial court obtaining subject matter jurisdiction or that 
Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was not conducted by a member of the judicial branch. 
Instead, the State argues that the article I, section 13 right to preliminary hearing by 
"magistrate" does not require a preliminary hearing by a member of the judicial branch. 
The historical context in which article I, section 13 was enacted and interpreted by early 
courts demonstrates otherwise. 
A. The Origins of the Preliminary Hearing and Its Historical Significance 
as a Check on Prosecutorial Discretion 
The right to a preliminary hearing is a "substantial" right, deeply-rooted in the 
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 422, 146 P.300, 
305 (Utah 1915). In response to executive branch abuses, the Magna Carta enshrined the 
requirement that before citizens can be forced to endure a felony trial, the prosecuting 
executive must show an independent judicial body—the grand jury—that probable cause 
exists to believe the crime was committed.11 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 
(1884); William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 305. 
11
 The right to indictment by grand jury has always been a substantial right. As 
Blackstone explained, while a grand jury only finds "whether there be sufficient cause to 
call upon the party to answer [the King's charge, a] grand jury however ought to be 
thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so far as their evidence goes; and not 
to rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities: a doctrine, that might be applied to 
very oppressive purposes." William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 300. 
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While misdemeanors could be prosecuted by information, even this practice was 
abused by the Crown. As William Blackstone explained, prosecutions by information 
"subjected the prosecutor to no costs, though on trial they proved to be groundless. This 
oppressive use of them, in the times preceding the [Glorious Revolution, occasioned a 
struggle," a struggle that resulted in prosecution by information being curtailed. William 
Blackstone, 4 Commentaries, 307, 305. To stop the abuses, a new law required "that the 
clerk of the crown shall not file any information without express direction from the court 
of the king's bench." Id. (emphasis added). As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, 
in England preliminary examinations of misdemeanor charges were held before a Justice 
of the Peace to permit a judicial determination that a trial is warranted. Utah v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 784 n.20 (Utah 1980).12 
In the late nineteenth century, states began experimenting with a substitute to the 
use of grand juries in felony cases by permitting the showing of probable cause to be 
made at a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer instead of a full grand jury. In 
1884, the United States Supreme Court held that preliminary hearings before a judicial 
officer provided adequate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and for that 
reason refused to incorporate against the states the Fifth Amendment grand jury 
requirement. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884). 
After Hurtado, a number of state courts also determined that a right to preliminary 
hearing was an adequate substitute for the right to grand jury, but did so while expressly 
recognizing that the hearing must be conducted by a member of the judicial branch. For 
F. Maitland, Justice and Police 129 (1885) (The "preliminary examination of accused 
persons had gradually assumed a very judicial form."). Numerous other sources have 
also noted the historical importance of the preliminary hearing. 
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example, in 1891 the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a preliminary hearing is an 
adequate "check upon hasty, ill-advised and malicious criminal prosecutions" because the 
examination process was "well understood" to be "a proceeding before a regularly 
constituted court or judicial magistrate in which the accused has the right to be present 
and hear all the witnesses, participate in their examination, and be heard also in his own 
behalf." In re Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 P. 470, 471 (1891) (emphasis added). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court reached the same conclusion after similarly noting 
that a preliminary examination includes, among other things, "an investigation by a 
judicial officer, a justice of the peace, of the accusation, where the accused may face his 
accusers and have an opportunity to establish his defense." In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 40 
P. 520, 522 (1895) (emphasis added). These cases confirm that at the time Utah became 
a state the requirement that preliminary hearings be conducted by a member of the 
independent judiciary—as a check on otherwise unfettered prosecutorial discretion— 
remained a substantive part of the right to preliminary hearing. 
B. Utah Law Requires that the Preliminary Hearing Be Conducted By a 
Magistrate, a Member of the Judicial Branch of Government 
A year after Boulter, the right to preliminary hearing made its way into article I, 
section 13 of the Utah Constitution, as did the requirement that such hearings be 
conducted by a member of the judiciary, a magistrate. Specifically, article 1, section 13 
provides: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, 
with or without such examination and commitment." Utah Const, art. I, § 13. 
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Although the word "magistrate" is not defined in the Utah Constitution, Utah 
courts have recognized that the word "had a very definite and concrete meaning" at the 
time of statehood. State v. Mclntrye, 92 Utah 177, 183; 66 P.3d 879, 881 (Utah 1937). 
A "magistrate" was defined as "an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest 
of a person charged with a public offense."13 Id (citing Comp. Laws Utah 1917 § 8677; 
Rev. Stat. Utah § 105-10-4 (1933)) see also Rev. Stat. Utah § 4607 (1898). Early statutes 
defined "magistrate" as including (i) justices of the supreme court; (ii) judges of the 
district courts; and (Hi) justices of the peace.14 Rev. Stat. Utah § 4608 (1898); Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917, § 8678. In short, at the time article I, section 13 was enacted, it was 
well understood that "the conducting of preliminary hearings . . . , by a court or 
magistrate, is the exercise of judicial power." State v. Shockley, 80 P. 865, 876 (Utah 
1905) (Bartch, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
The State suggests that the Utah Supreme Court recently ignored this history and 
recognized (in dicta) that a magistrate conducting a preliminary hearing could include 
someone not a member of the judiciary. (First Br. at 16-17.) The State cites State v. 
Humphrey, in which the court addressed the question of whether a criminal defendant 
may appeal a defect in a preliminary hearing without first seeking review from the trial 
court. 823 P.2d 464, 465-8 (Utah 1991). Under the statutes at the time, the question 
13
 As the Utah Supreme Court recently recognized, even the issuance of a search warrant 
is a "core judicial function," a phrase used in separation of powers analysis but 
nonetheless corroborative of the fact that preliminary hearings must be conducted by 
judicial officers. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). Also corroborative is 
the fact that the probable cause standard is identical for an arrest warrant and for a 
bindover order. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^ 18, 137 P.3d 787. 
14
 Later, in 1933, judges of the old city courts were added as permissible magistrates. 
Rev. Stat. Utah § 105-10-5 (1933). These judges also were members of the judiciary. 
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hinged upon whether the magistrate in a preliminary hearing was a "court of record," 
because, if it had been a court of record, then a direct appeal from its bindover order 
would have been permitted. Id at 468. The distinct question of whether magistrates 
must be members of the judicial branch was not before the court, as demonstrated by the 
court's actual holding: "Because magistrates are not courts of record when they conduct 
preliminary hearings and issue bindover orders, under the current jurisdictional statutes 
their orders are not immediately appealable." Id, 
The State asserts that Humphrey stands for the proposition that "a judge serving as 
a magistrate at a preliminary hearing is not exercising his judicial authority." (First Br. at 
17.) The language the State quotes from Humphrey in support of its assertion makes an 
entirely different point: "judges, 'when sitting as magistrates have the jurisdiction and 
powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those that pertain to their respective 
judicial offices.'" (First Br. at 17 (quoting Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 467).) The quoted 
language merely states that judges serving as magistrates do not carry all aspects of "their 
respective judicial offices" to the task of conducting a preliminary hearing. It does not 
say that magistrates need not be judicial officers.15 
Nor could it, as the Utah Supreme Court also recognizes that magistrates enter 
final, appealable judgments after a preliminary hearing when they dismiss an information 
15
 This is confirmed by the case from which the language the State quotes in Humphreys 
originated, Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1977). Morris, much like 
Humphrey, held that a "city judge, acting not as a city judge with jurisdiction over the 
offense, but as a magistrate,... did not have the power to dismiss the accusatory 
pleading brought before him for the purpose of preliminary examination." Id Again, 
this has nothing to do with whether the person conducting preliminary hearing must be a 
member of the judicial branch. If it did, however, Morris recognized that the "office of 
magistrate" is conferred upon individuals "who exercise judicial powers." Id. 
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for lack of probable cause. State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 54-55 (Utah 1994). In the first 
opening brief, the State defines judicial authority as the authority to enter final 
judgments, something magistrates do under Jaeger. (First Br. at 17-18.) Therefore, under 
the State's own logic, magistrates in preliminary hearings are exercising judicial 
authority. While Humphery did not address the question of whether someone not a 
member of the judiciary may conduct preliminary hearings, Jaeger confirms that the 
answer is "no." 
The State also argues that the commissioner presiding over Mr. Ford's preliminary 
hearing had authority to do so under Utah Code section 77-1-3 (1993), which defined 
"magistrate" to include court commissioners. (First Br. at 19.) Plainly, a statute cannot 
alter the content of article I, section 13. Nor does the State suggest it could. Instead, the 
State recognizes that its statutory argument depends entirely upon its assertion that 
"[magistrates presiding at preliminary hearings are not exercising 'judicial authority.'" 
(First Br. at 21.) For reasons set forth previously, this assertion is incorrect. In the end, 
the State's argument demonstrates that commissioners could not exercise "judicial 
authority" because such authority had not been "expressly provided to them by the 
Judicial Council," a prerequisite to anyone exercising judicial powers. (First Br. at 21.) 
The State's final argument is that "the identity of the person officiating at a 
hearing is not integral to the court's jurisdiction." (First Br. at 8.) The State explains that 
the particular commissioner who conducted Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing had adequate 
qualifications because "only lawyers with criminal law experience could serve as 
commissioners determining whether there was probable cause." (First Br. at 22, 29.) 
This argument demonstrates the problem with adopting criteria other than the long-
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standing requirement that a member of the judiciary must preside over preliminary 
hearings. The State's suggested alternative criteria of any lawyer with criminal law 
experience—which would include every prosecutor,16 even the Attorney General—has 
been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in similar circumstances. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971), New Hampshire had 
authorized its Attorney General to make a constitutionally required probable cause 
determination; in this case, for a search warrant. New Hampshire argued that (i) its 
Attorney General, who had been authorized as a "justice of the peace to issue warrants 
under then-existing state law, did in fact act as a 'neutral and detached magistrate5" and 
(ii) any error was harmless because there was undisputedly probable cause to issue the 
warrant. Id at 450. The court rejected both arguments. The court first rejected the 
contention that the Attorney General had been authorized to issue warrants and had acted 
impartially, holding that "there could hardly be a more appropriate setting than this for a 
perse rule of disqualification rather than a case-by-case evaluation of all the 
circumstances." Id. The Court then rejected the harmless error argument, holding that 
even though there was probable cause, "[s]ince he was not the neutral and detached 
magistrate required by the Constitution, the search stands on no firmer ground than if 
there had been no warrant at all." Id at 453. 
Similarly, there is no reason for this Court to recognize anything other than the per 
se rule that only members of the judiciary may conduct preliminary hearings under article 
I, section 13, a requirement that has been recognized since Utah became a state. Because 
16
 Presumably, a prosecutor has already determined there is probable cause before filing 
charges, so without additional criteria—such as membership in the judicial branch of 
government—would render the right to preliminary hearing a nullity. 
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the commissioner who conducted Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was not a member of 
the judicial branch, Mr. Ford was denied the preliminary hearing guaranteed under article 
I, section 13. 
C. A Magistrate Must Bind Over a Defendant on Each Charge Before a 
District Court May Obtain Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Mr. Ford was convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon, a charge that was 
never presented to a magistrate. Therefore, the prosecutor never obtained the authority to 
prosecute, and the original trial court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction to try, 
Mr. Ford on that charge. The State concedes that "a preliminary hearing and bindover 
are 'essential to a court's jurisdiction over a felony,' and that a district court may 'try a 
defendant [only] on the specific charge that is bound over.'" (First Br. at 22 (citation 
omitted) (alteration in original).) While the State maintains that it may dispute that an 
article I, section 13 hearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite "in future cases," it candidly 
admits that it may not do so in this case because it did not raise the argument below. 
(First Br. at 23 n. 8.) 
The existing precedent demonstrates not only that the failure of the prosecutor to 
present the possession charge to "examination and commitment by a magistrate" 
precluded the original trial court from obtaining subject matter jurisdiction, but also that 
the failure to provide an article I, section 13 hearing may be raised at any time. Under 
Utah law, where a charge is not first presented to a magistrate, the trial court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to try a defendant, even if there is ample evidence to support the 
charge. State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860, 863 (1918) ("Where a complaint 
before an examining magistrate charges a certain offense, the defendant cannot be held to 
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answer for any other not involved within it, notwithstanding the evidence before the 
magistrate may establish another offense."); see also State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 
1085, 1087 (1908) (holding defendant could not be tried for offense distinct from the one 
upon which he had preliminary hearing). 
Because identity of the person who may determine probable cause is a substantial 
part of the right to a preliminary hearing, presentment to the wrong entity precludes 
jurisdiction. In 1899, the Utah Supreme Court held that presentment to a magistrate 
under article I, section 13 could not substitute for presentment to a grand jury, where the 
alleged crime was committed before Utah became a state and therefore before article I, 
section 13. State v. Rock, 57 P. 532, 532 (1899). Even though the Utah Constitution 
then recognized that felony charges could be presented to a magistrate and even though 
there was no suggestion that the State had not demonstrated probable cause, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "the prosecuting attorney had no authority to file the 
information."17 Id. at 45. As here, the State did not have the authority "to take from the 
accused a constitutional right which belonged to him when the offense was committed."18 
Id 
After Utah became a state, it became equally essential that the charge be presented 
to "a magistrate having jurisdiction to investigate the charge and determine if there is 
probable cause," which, as demonstrated above, requires that the preliminary hearing be 
17
 In contrast, when the wrong judicial officer presides over a preliminary hearing, the 
defect is not jurisdictional, as the right to preliminary hearing by magistrate is fulfilled. 
State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142 (Utah 1989) (bindover by magistrate in wrong county 
not jurisdictional). 
1R 
This case is of particular note because the magistrate had de facto authority to conduct 
the preliminary hearing, something the State repeatedly asserts is sufficient to cure any 
jurisdictional defect in this case, an assertion discussed in Part III. (First Br. at 24-27.) 
6471112 31 
conducted by a member of the judiciary. State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196, 199 (Utah 1937) 
(emphasis added). The Court was correct when it recently recognized that "Utah has 
long recognized that a preliminary hearing is essential to a court's jurisdiction over a 
felony," as a "district court has jurisdiction only to try a defendant on the specific charge 
that is bound over." State v. Marshall 2005 UT App 269, * 1-2, 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 
260; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 5(a) & 7(i)(2) (requiring felony information to be filed 
before a magistrate before a bindover may be issued and jurisdiction acquired by district 
court). Therefore, under settled Utah law, unless a charge is first presented for 
"examination and commitment by a magistrate," a prosecutor lacks authority to file an 
information containing that charge and the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
to try the accused of that charge. 
An accused can only waive the right to challenge the State's failure to present each 
charge to a magistrate by expressly waiving the right to preliminary hearing. Article I, 
section 13 provides that "the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of 
the State." Utah Const, art. I, § 13. Unsurprisingly, the Utah Supreme Court had held 
that once a defendant expressly waives the right to preliminary hearing, he cannot then 
complain that the charges against him were not first presented to a magistrate. State v. 
Freeman, 71 P.2d 196 (Utah 1937); United States v. Eldregde, 13 P. 673, 676 (Utah 
1887). Absent an express waiver of the right to preliminary hearing, however, the failure 
to present a charge to a magistrate is jurisdictional and therefore not waivable.19 In this 
case, it is undisputed that Mr. Ford did not waive his right to preliminary hearing. 
19
 A possible exception is when a defendant pleads guilty to the crime. Rule 10(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: "Any defect or irregularity in or want or 
absence of any proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to arraignment shall 
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A number of non-jurisdictional defects in a preliminary hearing may be implicitly 
waived if not raised at the time the defendant enters an initial plea. Examples include 
(i) the accused does not have counsel,20 (ii) the accused is not permitted to confront 
witnesses, or (iii) the evidence does not support probable cause. However, Mr. Ford 
does not allege any of these defects here. 
Where a defendant does not waive his right to have each charge against him first 
presented to a magistrate, and yet the State fails to do so, the trial court cannot obtain 
subject matter jurisdiction to try the defendant, and therefore, any beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt conviction must be vacated. State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Utah 1988) 
(reversing conviction when defendant was convicted of criminal episode for which he 
had not been bound over); State v. Pettit 93 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1939) (same); State v. 
Nelson, 176 P. 860 (Utah 1918) (same). 
The failure to provide "examination and commitment by magistrate" for each 
charge cannot be waived, as it can be raised for the first time on appeal, State v. Hoben, 
102 P. 1000 (Utah 1909), and can be raised in a habeas petition. Winnovich v. Emery, 93 
P. 988, 994 (Utah 1908). As the court explained in Emery, "on habeas corpus 
proceedings," if a court determines that "there was no preliminary examination or hearing 
be specifically and expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is 
waived." However, even this principal is unclear when a challenge involves a trial 
court's jurisdiction. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^[15, 167 P.3d 1046 (guilty plea 
waives right to challenge all "nonjurisdictional" defects in the preliminary hearing). 
20
 Crouch v. State, 467 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1970) (voluntary waiver of counsel at 
preliminary hearing cannot be grounds for setting aside a conviction on appeal). 
21
 Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61 at YP 8-19 (preliminary hearing valid despite defendant's 
inability to confront witnesses); 
22
 State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing cases that concern evidentiary 
defects). 
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by the magistrate, the accused should be discharged." Id The court recognized that such 
a jurisdictional defect exists unless the "magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject-matter 
and of the person of the accused." Id 
This rule under article I, section 13 is consistent with the general principal that a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. The court recently 
explained that "when subject matter [jurisdiction] does not exist, neither the parties nor 
the court can do anything to fill that void." Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199,1J12, 29 
P.3d 13; see also Peterson v. Utah Bd. Of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995) 
("subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that can and should be addressed sua sponte when 
jurisdiction is questionable"). 
Because Mr. Ford did not waive his right to preliminary hearing by magistrate and 
a magistrate did not "examine" the possession of a dangerous weapon charge, the 
prosecutor never obtained the authority to file an information in the original trial court, 
and the original trial court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction to try Mr. Ford. 
Because the original trial court lacked jurisdiction, the district court in this case correctly 
vacated Mr. Ford's sentence. This Court should affirm. 
III. The Commissioner's Exercise of the Authority to Conduct Mr. Ford's 
Preliminary Hearing Resulted From an Unconstitutional Delegation of a Core 
Judicial Function 
Mr. Ford's petition raises an independent basis to affirm the district court's order 
vacating his conviction and sentence. Specifically, Mr. Ford argues that the legislature 
23
 At times, the State suggests that this principle applies only when reviewing the 
jurisdiction of the presiding court. (First Br. at 13.) This cannot be correct. As 
explained previously, the traditional use of habeas petitions was to challenge an original 
trial court's jurisdiction in a separate proceeding. 
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unconstitutionally delegated to a commissioner the judicial authority to conduct 
preliminary hearings, a violation of article V, section 1 and article VIII, section 1. As the 
State recognizes in its first opening brief, the legislature authorized commissioners to 
conduct preliminary hearings, but the Judicial Council did not. (First Br. at 20-21.) The 
State argues that this does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation because 
(i) conducting a preliminary hearing is not a core judicial function and only core judicial 
functions cannot be delegated to non-judicial officers; and (ii) the commissioner 
presiding over Mr. Ford's hearing had de facto judicial authority, and therefore, her 
actions did not strip the original trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. (First Br. at 24-
27.) 
Both arguments fail. Under current case law discussing unconstitutional 
delegation doctrine, conducting a preliminary hearing is a core judicial function because 
(i) a magistrate's decision to bindover an accused is immediately enforceable and (ii) a 
magistrate's refusal to bindover constitutes a final judgment. In addition, assuming the 
commissioner conducting Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing was exercising de facto judicial 
authority, the doctrine does not apply to preclude affording relief to Mr. Ford. Instead, 
non-delegation cases provide that the first citizen to raise a particular unconstitutional 
delegation claim—in this case, Mr. Ford—may benefit from having raised it regardless of 
whether there was de facto authority. In other words, the doctrine of de facto authority 
does not affect Mr. Ford's petition. 
6471112 35 
A. Conducting a Preliminary Hearing is a Core Judicial Function That 
Commissioners Lack Authority to Perform 
For the reasons discussed previously in Section II, a person conducting a 
preliminary hearing under article I, section 13 must be a member of the independent 
judiciary. Under the non-delegation doctrine, conducting a preliminary hearing is also a 
core judicial function. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained what constitute core judicial functions in Salt 
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994). In Ohms, the court held that a court 
commissioner lacks the required judicial authority in misdemeanor cases to enter a final 
judgment of conviction and impose sentence, something the court described as a "core 
judicial function." Id at 851. The court therefore vacated the conviction and sentence 
because the delegation of judicial power was unconstitutional. Id. at 855. 
The Ohms court explained that core judicial functions include (i) "the power to 
hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation," 
(ii) "the authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies," (iii) "the authority to 
enforce any valid judgment, decree or order," and (iv) "all powers that are necessary to 
protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch." Id. at 849. In contrast, core 
judicial functions do not include functions that are generally designed merely to "assist" 
courts, "such as conducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and 
making recommendations to judges." Id, at 851 n.17. The Ohms court held that because 
commissioners then-presiding over misdemeanor trials entered final judgments, they 
were exercising a core judicial function. 
Four years later, the Utah Supreme Court explained the doctrine further in State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). In Thomas, the court held that issuing a search 
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warrant is also a core judicial function that commissioners may not perform. The court 
based its holding on the following considerations. First, a search warrant is an 
enforceable order. Id at 303. Second, a search warrant relates to one of "the most 
fundamental and cherished rights we possess," namely to be free from unreasonable 
search as seizures. Id. at 303. Third, in issuing a search warrant a commissioner "did not 
recommend to the judge that the warrant be issued but rather issued it herself." Id. at 
304. Fourth, the issuance of a search warrant is not reviewable by a judge. Id Finally, 
"while issuing a search warrant does not rise to the level of finality as entering judgment 
and imposing sentence, as was disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final to establish it 
as a core judicial function." Id. 
The same five considerations apply to orders issued by magistrates in preliminary 
hearings. First, a bindover order is immediately enforceable, as no further judicial 
determination is necessary to bindover the accused. And when a magistrate refuses to 
bindover, the State is precluded from proceeding to trial, or even from re-presenting the 
same charges unless new evidence emerges. State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 645 (Utah 
1986). A magistrate's orders, like search warrants, are immediately enforceable. 
Second, a bindover order also relates to one of our most cherished rights. The 
right to a preliminary hearing in article I, section 13 substitutes for the ancient right to 
indictment by grand jury, and affords citizens protection against "the 'substantial 
degradation and expense' attendant to a criminal trial." Id at 646. The judicial check on 
prosecutorial discretion is at least as cherished as the judicial check on the authority of 
the executive branch to search citizens' homes. 
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Third, a bindover order is not a mere recommendation. The magistrate enters the 
bindover order, and the accused is boundover. The magistrate does not recommend to the 
district court that it enter the bindover order. 
Fourth, while a bindover order—like the validity of a search warrant—is later 
reviewable by a trial court, the court does not review the bindover order de novo, as it 
would an order issued in a small claims court or justice court. Because bindover orders 
involve a "magistrate's factual findings," they "require some deference by a reviewing 
court." State v. Wodskow, 896 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The same deference to 
bindover orders is afforded by appellate courts. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^26, 137 
P.3d 787 ("in reviewing a magistrate's bindover decision, an appellate court should 
afford the decision limited deference"). 
Finally, magistrates conducting preliminary hearings enter final orders, not just 
"sufficiently final" orders, as the Thomas court described search warrants. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that when a magistrate refuses to bindover an accused and 
instead dismisses the information, the magistrate's order—unlike a search warrant—is 
final and appealable. State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1994). Therefore, a 
commissioner conducting a preliminary hearing does enter final judgments, which is 
certainly "sufficiently final to establish it as a core judicial function." Thomas, 961 P.2d 
at 304. Under the rule announced in Thomas, conducting a preliminary hearing is a core 
judicial function that a non-judicial officer, such as a commissioner, may not perform. 
This result was confirmed by Jones v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94 
P.3d 283, in which the Utah Supreme Court held that when the Board of Pardons issues 
"retaking warrants," which are similar to arrest warrants, it does not exercise a core 
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judicial function. The court explained that "Board members, unlike commissioners, do 
not serve in 'courts of record,' a characteristic that defined the realm of both Ohms and 
Thomas." Id. at [^16. Later, the court reiterated that unlike the Board, justice court 
judges, and judges pro tempore, "commissioners are assigned to courts of record and are 
therefore ineligible to perform 'core judicial functions' under Ohms and Thomas." Id. at 
Tfl7 n.l. After Jones, then, what makes commissioners ineligible to perform core judicial 
functions is that they serve in courts of record. 
When commissioners act as magistrates in presiding over preliminary hearings, 
they also are serving in courts of record. The State cites State v. Humphery, 823 P.2d 
464 (Utah 1991) for the proposition that bindover orders are not immediately appealable, 
and therefore, magistrates presiding over preliminary hearings are not serving on courts 
of record. (First Br. at 17.) While this is a possible interpretation of Humphery, this 
interpretation has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Three years after Humphery 
in State v. Jaeger, the court held that while a magistrate's bindover order is not final and 
immediately appealable, when a magistrate declines to bindover and enters an order 
dismissing the information, that order is "a final judgment of dismissal" and "a final 
adjudicative decision." 886 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1994). The court therefore recognized in 
Jaeger that magistrates presiding over preliminary hearings do enter final judgments, 
which makes them courts of record under the definition in Jones.24 If a magistrate serves 
24
 In Jaeger, the court discusses the concept of a judge wearing two hats, one for his 
"judicial" functions and one for his "nonadjudicative" functions. 886 P.2d at 54 n.2. 
This distinction makes some sense when discussing the right to an immediate appeal 
because there is nothing inconsistent with allowing an immediate appeal from the refusal 
to bindover, but not allowing one from the decision to bindover. However, this 
distinction cannot work similarly in the non-delegation setting. If a magistrate must 
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on a court of record when he issues search warrants then he also serves on a court of 
record when he declines to bindover an accused for trial. 
Presiding over a preliminary hearing is a core judicial function that commissioners 
may not perform under the criteria set forth in Thomas and the court-of-record 
requirement set forth in Jones. Because presiding over a preliminary hearing is a core 
judicial function, a court commissioner could not perform that function unless she could 
exercise judicial authority, authority the State recognizes court commissioners lacked. 
Therefore, when the legislature delegated the authority to serve as magistrates to 
commissioners, the delegation was unconstitutional under article V, section 1 and article 
VII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
B. A Commissioner Conducting a Preliminary Hearing Also Violates 
Separation of Powers 
Even if conducting a preliminary hearing were not a core judicial function, having 
a non-judicial officer conduct a preliminary hearing would still violate the Utah 
Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court uses a separate analytical model to determine 
whether a legislative grant of judicial power violates the separation of powers, even 
where no core judicial function is involved. A violation occurs where (i) the actors are 
"charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of the [other] branches;" 
(ii) "the function . . . appertain^] to another branch of government;" and (iii) the 
constitution does not expressly permit the delegation. In re Young, 1999 UT 6, [^8, 976 
P.2d581. 
exercise any judicial authority in a preliminary hearing, then only one with judicial 
authority can serve as a magistrate. 
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All three criteria are satisfied here. First, commissioners do exercise powers 
properly belonging to the judiciary, such as determining whether there is probable cause 
to bindover and entering final judgments by dismissing informations. 
Second, determining probable cause and dismissing informations appertain to the 
judicial branch. As explained above, article I, section 13 requires that judicial 
magistrates conduct preliminary hearings. The best evidence of this is that "magistrate" 
was originally defined as "an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a 
person charged with a public offense," a core judicial function. State v. Mclntrye, 92 
Utah 177, 183; 66 P.3d 879, 881 (Utah 1937) (citing Comp. Laws Utah 1917 § 8677; 
Rev. Stat. Utah § 105-10-4 (1933)) see also Rev. Stat. Utah § 4607. Article I, section 13 
requires that a preliminary hearing be conducted by a magistrate, and a magistrate is a 
judicial officer. 
Third, no constitutional provision expressly permits anyone other than a member 
of the judiciary to perform these functions. Therefore, when the commissioner presided 
over Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing, it also violated separation of powers, regardless of 
whether conducting a preliminary hearing is a core judicial function (which it is). 
C. Even if the Commissioner Had De Facto Authority, Mr. Ford's 
Conviction Nonetheless Should Have Been Vacated 
The State argues that even if the commissioner had no authority to preside over 
Mr. Ford's preliminary hearing, she had de facto judicial authority, which is sufficient to 
cure any jurisdictional defects.25 (First Br. at 26-27.) Even if the State is correct, 
25
 This if far from obvious, as Mr. Ford is not challenging the original trial court's subject 
matter jurisdiction by challenging the authority of the original trial judge. Instead, he is 
challenging the original trial court's jurisdiction because the prosecutor lacked the 
authority to file the information. The reason the prosecutor lacked such authority is 
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Mr. Ford would still be entitled to have his conviction vacated, just as the district court 
ordered. As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Thomas, the de facto authority 
doctrine does not apply to the first citizen to bring a jurisdictional defect to the court's 
attention. 961 P.2d at 302. Therefore, the doctrine of de facto authority cannot preclude 
affording habeas relief to Mr. Ford. This Court should affirm the order vacating Mr. 
Ford's conviction and sentence. 
IV. Mr. Ford Has the Right to Paid Counsel to Defend Against the State's Use of 
the Judicial Process to Obtain the Legal Authority to Imprison Him 
The State's second opening brief addresses the district court's ruling on remand 
that Mr. Ford is entitled to paid counsel under the Indigent Defense Act, the Utah 
Constitution, and the United States Constitution. After the district court granted 
Mr. Ford's pro se habeas petition and vacated his sentence, the State had no legal basis to 
deprive Mr. Ford of his liberty. The district court provided the State two avenues for 
dealing with Mr. Ford. First, it could have accepted the district court's proffered 
opportunity to re-try Mr. Ford, if it could first establish probable cause in a preliminary 
hearing before a magistrate. (R. 240.) Second, the State could have dropped the case 
because Mr. Ford had already spent 13 years in prison for possession of a weapon. 
The State chose to pursue a third route—to prosecute this appeal and to seek the 
authority to send Mr. Ford back to prison. Had the State sought to send Mr. Ford back to 
prison in a new trial, then Mr. Ford unquestionably would have had the right to paid legal 
representation. As demonstrated below, that right to counsel cannot be extinguished 
because the court commissioner—as a non-judicial officer—lacked authority to preside 
over the preliminary hearing. The commissioner's de facto authority cannot cure the 
jurisdictional defect in the original trial court. 
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simply because the State has chosen to deprive Mr. Ford of the same liberty through an 
appellate court instead of a trial court. 
From the outset, it is worth noting the scope of the right to counsel at issue in this 
appeal. The State is correct that the right at issue here concerns very narrow 
circumstances in which (i) a district court already has granted a habeas petition (or 
petition for post-conviction relief); (ii) in granting the petition, the court has vacated the 
legal basis of confinement; and (iii) the State has decided to appeal the district court's 
ruling in an effort to regain the legal basis of confinement. (Second Br. at 2.) Mr. Ford 
disagrees with the State that a successful petitioner also must have been released from 
prison to qualify for the right to counsel recognized by the district court; however, the 
Court need not resolve this question, as Mr. Ford, in fact, is currently free. 
Normally, Mr. Ford would address the statutory argument first, as it is a 
prerequisite to reaching constitutional issues. However, Mr. Ford agrees with the State's 
characterization of the Indigent Defense Act ("IDA") as designed to "bring Utah into 
compliance with its federal constitutional obligations." (Second Br. at 5, 21.) For this 
reason, Mr. Ford will first outline the constitutional grounds for the right to counsel, 
beginning with the federal constitution, which defines the minimum obligation Utah has 
to provide counsel to its citizens, through statute or otherwise. 
A. Mr. Ford Has a Federal Constitutional Right to Counsel Because the 
State is Employing the Judicial Process to Deprive Mr. Ford of His 
Liberty 
Mr. Ford is entitled to paid appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel (as incorporated against the states) and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
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due process and to equal protection require the State to provide Mr. Ford paid counsel on 
appeal. The State argues that under the United States Constitution there is no right to 
counsel beyond the first appeal of right from a criminal conviction. The case law 
indicates otherwise. 
1. Ford Has a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
A citizen has the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment when a state 
employs the judicial process in an attempt to alter the status quo and to deprive the citizen 
of his liberty on the ground that the citizen has committed a crime. This is precisely what 
the State is attempting to do here. Currently, the State has no legal basis to imprison Mr. 
Ford. With its appeal, the State is seeking a legal basis to imprison Mr. Ford for violating 
a criminal statute forbidding the possession of a dangerous weapon. Under federal case 
law, Mr. Ford has a right to paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal. 
The State argues that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only during a 
criminal prosecution and the first level of appellate review. (Second Br. at 32-36.) It 
buries in a footnote a case that demonstrates otherwise, a case upon which the district 
court relied, Blakenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 1997). (Second Br. at 35-36 
n. 11.) The State correctly notes that under normal circumstances the right to counsel 
ends after the first level of appellate review. There is no right to counsel where a 
defendant is initiating a discretionary appeal to eliminate the State's legal authority to 
imprison the defendant. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "it is 
ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking 
not to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt 
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made by a judge or jury below." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (emphasis 
added). 
However, under Blankenship, where the defendant prevails in the first level of 
appellate review, and the State initiates a discretionary appeal to regain the legal authority 
to imprison the defendant, then the defendant does have a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 118 F.3d at 317 (recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the 
"state, rather than the defendant, has requested and obtained the discretionary review"). 
Mr. Ford, as an appellee, is no differently positioned than was Mr. Blankenship, also an 
appellee. As in Blankenship, the State here is attempting to regain its legal authority to 
imprison Mr. Ford. Therefore, Mr. Ford has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
defend against the State's appeal. 
The State attempts to distinguish this case from Blankenship by drawing a 
distinction between civil from criminal. The State argues that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel does not attach in civil proceedings, and that a habeas proceeding is a civil 
proceeding. (Second Br. at 34-35.) However, the distinction between civil and criminal 
cannot bear the weight the State places on it. 
For example, juvenile proceedings are labeled "civil," and yet the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches because the child is "subjected to the loss of his 
liberty." In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967). This alone demonstrates that the 
civil/criminal distinction does not determine the scope of the right to counsel. Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("the juvenile has a right to 
26
 Mr. Ford is not aware of any other case to address a constitutional right to counsel 
under these circumstances. 
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appointed counsel even though those proceedings may be styled "civil" and not 
"criminal"). 
The State argues that Gault stands only for the "proposition that due process 
guarantees counsel to a juvenile facing proceedings that equate to a criminal 
prosecution." (Second Br. at 12.) This argument proves the opposite of what the State 
supposes. The fact that juvenile proceedings are civil and yet "equate to a criminal 
prosecution," as the State recognizes, demonstrates that the civil/criminal distinction is 
not relevant to the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In any event, as the 
Tenth Circuit has noted when discussing the right to counsel, [i]t would be absurd to 
distinguish criminal and civil incarceration; from the perspective of the person 
incarcerated, the jail is just as bleak no matter which label is used." Walker v. McLain, 
768 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1985). The distinction between civil proceedings and 
criminal proceedings cannot distinguish this case from Blankenship. 
The State argues that United States Supreme Court case law demonstrates there is 
no federal right to paid counsel in post-conviction proceedings under any circumstances. 
(Second Br. at 34.) These cases, however, demonstrate only that there is no right to 
counsel for a prisoner challenging the legal basis for confinement. Murray v. Giarratano, 
492 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (no right to counsel to prosecute post-conviction petitions in capital 
cases); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (no "right to counsel when mounting 
collateral attacks") (emphasis added). These cases do not even address—let alone 
govern—the situation here, where Mr. Ford is defending against the State's attempt to 
regain the legal basis for confinement. 
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Because Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence have been vacated, like Mr. 
Blankenship, Mr. Ford is no longer employing the judicial process to challenge the legal 
basis of his confinement, because no legal basis exists. Instead, the State is employing 
the judicial process to reinstate that legal basis so it can send Mr. Ford back to prison to 
finish the final 2 years of his 15-year sentence. The cases cited by the State do not deal 
with this situation, but Blankenship does. Mr. Ford has a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. This Court should affirm. 
2. Ford Has a Right to Appointed, Paid Counsel Under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Mr. Ford also has a right to counsel under the due process clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. If this Court concludes that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
apply—even though the legal basis the State seeks to send Mr. Ford to prison is a 
violation of a criminal statute—then the due process right to counsel does apply. There is 
no question that the due process clause applies in civil cases; therefore, the State's 
distinction between civil and criminal is not outcome determinative. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 
24 (recognizing right to counsel in hearings to termination parental rights where the 
parents' interests are particularly strong and the likelihood of error is particularly high). 
The United State Supreme Court weighs the following three factors to determine 
whether the due process right to counsel attaches: (i) "the private interests at stake;" 
(ii) "the government's interest;" and (iii) "the risk that the procedures used will lead to 
erroneous decisions." IdL at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 
(1976)). These factors weigh in favor of Mr. Ford. First, Mr. Ford has a commanding 
private interest—his liberty. Second, the government interest in further depriving Mr. 
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Ford of his liberty is minimal, as Mr. Ford has already served 13 years of a 15 year 
sentence for possession of a weapon. Moreover, the State's interest here should be 
aligned with Mr. Ford. Both have an interest in ensuring that citizens are not denied 
basic constitutional rights. Finally, there is a substantial risk of an erroneous decision if 
citizens in the position of Mr. Ford are not provided with counsel. The issues presented 
in the State's appeal are complex, "abtruse, technical [and] unfamiliar" to Mr. Ford, who 
has no formal legal training. Id. at 29. 
The most analogous cases applying these three elements are those involving the 
revocation of probation or parole. In those cases, the State is similarly reasserting the 
right to imprison a citizen. Under these circumstances, the right to counsel attaches. 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (decision of whether to appoint paid 
counsel at probation revocation hearing determined on a case-by-case basis); Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (decision of whether to appoint paid counsel at 
parole revocation hearing determined on a case-by-case basis), Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
480 (1980) (plurality) (an indigent prisoner is entitled to appointed counsel before being 
involuntarily transferred for treatment to a state mental hospital). 
Under this line of cases, the district court did not abuse its direction in ruling that 
the right to due process requires appointed paid counsel for Mr. Ford to defend against 
the State's appeal. Mr. Ford is currently free and faces imprisonment if the State is 
successful with its appeal. Mr. Ford's fundamental liberty interest is therefore in 
jeopardy. The due process clause requires the appointment of paid counsel for Mr. Ford. 
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B. Mr. Ford Has a Right to Counsel Under the State Constitution Because 
the State is Invoking the Judicial Process to Deprive Mr. Ford of His 
Liberty 
The Utah Constitution also provides Mr. Ford the right to paid counsel. Article I, 
section 12 guarantees "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear to defend in person and by counsel," and article I, section 7 guarantees that "[n]o 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah 
Const, art. I, §§ 7, 12. Much like the right to counsel under the Untied States 
Constitution, whether this appeal is considered criminal or civil is irrelevant. If the 
State's appeal is "criminal" in nature—because the State seeks to regain the legal 
authority to imprison Mr. Ford for violation of a criminal statute—then the article I, 
section 12 right to counsel applies. If the State's appeal is "civil" in nature—but 
nonetheless involves the State's attempt to obtain the legal authority to deprive Mr. Ford 
of his fundamental liberty interest—then article I, section 7 guarantees the right to 
counsel. Either way, Mr. Ford has the right to counsel under the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the right to counsel under article I, 
section 12 in probation revocation hearings. State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 
1971). In Eichler, the court recognized that—much like petitioners in the post-conviction 
setting—one on probation is "not entitled to all of the protections the law affords one 
accused of crime in the first instance." Id at 888-89. The court nonetheless held that 
because a revocation of probation carried with it the "possibility of changing the 
defendant's status from one of being at liberty to one of being in confinement," the right 
to counsel under article I, section 12 applied. Id at 889. Importantly, the court held that 
the question of whether to appoint counsel under article I, section 12 "could well be left 
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to the discretion of the trial judge, with his action subject to review for abuse of 
discretion." Id. 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing paid counsel to Mr. 
Ford. Like Mr. Eichler, Mr. Ford is similarly facing the possibility of having his status 
changed "from one of being at liberty to one of being in confinement." However, Mr. 
Ford's liberty interest is stronger than that of a person on probation, as Mr. Ford's release 
is not conditional. The legal basis for confining Mr. Ford has been extinguished entirely. 
The State ignores Eichler and focuses on a case it appears to have overruled, Beal 
v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 (1969). (Second Br. at 26.) In Beal decided 
two years before Eichler, the court held that the right to counsel does not attach in parole 
revocation hearings. The sole dissenting justice in Eichler complained that Beal 
governed, but the majority disagreed. Eichler, 483 P.2d at 890 (Ellett, J., dissenting) 
("The case of Beal v. Turner is dispositive of the present matter insofar as the need for 
counsel is concerned."). 
The only other case the State cites—Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994)— 
involves the right to counsel in a parole grant hearing, an entirely different matter. 
(Second Br. 27-28.) In parole grant hearings, the prisoner is attempting to gain liberty he 
currently lacks; whereas in a parole or probation revocation hearing—like here—the 
State is attempting to obtain the right to take that liberty away.28 Tellingly, the Neel court 
27
 This Court subsequently recognized that insofar as the federal right to counsel is 
concerned, whether the right to counsel attaches in a probation revocation hearing is 
determined on a case by case basis. State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112, 1116 n.3 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). Here, the district court determined the right to counsel attaches. 
In addition, the Neel court focused on the non-adversarial nature of a parole grant 
hearing and had "no desire to turn these hearings into adversarial or confrontational 
exercises." 886 P.2d at 1103 n.7. The proceedings here are plainly adversarial. 
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did not cite to Beal, apparently agreeing that it had been overruled in Eichler. If there 
were no distinction between parole grant hearings and parole revocation hearings with 
respect to the right to counsel, as the State contends, then Beal would have been 
controlling authority and would have been cited as such. 
The rule emerging from these cases is that whenever the State is attempting to 
regain the right to imprison on the basis of a violation of a criminal statute, the right to 
counsel attaches. The fact that this is occurring here in the post-conviction setting is 
irrelevant. The Utah Supreme Court has suggested that the right to counsel attaches in 
post-conviction proceedings even where the petitioner is attempting to regain his liberty, 
but in each instance has declined to resolve the issue expressly. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 
249, 259 (Utah 1998) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("defendant should be provided with 
paid counsel and one state-financed automatic post-conviction proceeding"); Bruner v. 
Carver, 920 P.2dll53, 1158 (Utah 1996) (declining to address the issue because it had 
not been briefed independently of the Sixth Amendment issue); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 530-31 (Utah 1994) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (stating that post-conviction 
proceedings should be considered criminal in some instances). If the right to counsel to 
prosecute a post-conviction petition is a close call, then the right to counsel here is not, as 
the status quo is that the State lacks any legal basis to confine Mr. Ford. Under these 
circumstances, Mr. Ford has an article I, section 12 right to counsel. 
The State cites Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, 84 P.3d 1150 for the proposition 
that there is no right to counsel in any post-conviction proceedings. (Second Br. at 27.) 
However, Hutchings involved the right to counsel in an appeal from a parole revocation 
hearing and in prosecuting a petition for post-conviction relief. 2003 UT 52 at f 19. Even 
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so, it did not analyze the question under the Utah Constitution, and instead provides only 
a single cite to federal law, idL at [^20, something the State later acknowledges. (Second 
Br. at 27 n.8.) In addition, Hutchings held that the right-to-counsel claims were 
procedurally barred. 2003 UT 52 at f 20. Hutchings does not address the issues 
presented here. 
Insofar as the article I, section 12 right to counsel does not extend in any way to 
the post-conviction setting, the right to counsel under the due process clause in article I, 
section 7 applies. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that due process may require 
counsel in some circumstances similar to those requiring the right to counsel under the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017 
1029-30, n.13 (Utah 1996). Specifically, the Monson court stated that the due process 
right to counsel would attach—even in parole grant hearings—where counsel could assist 
with ensuring "accuracy and reliability" in the proceedings. Id at 1030. Here, as 
explained previously, counsel is enormously helpful to appellate courts when they review 
district court orders granting habeas relief. The State has paid counsel to present its 
arguments; and prisoners seeking to maintain the relief they have already been granted 
deserve no less. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, courts should fashion a post-conviction 
remedy whenever required to further "fundamental fairness." Manning v. State, 2005 UT 
61, T[30, 122 P.3d 628. Where a district court has ruled that the legal basis of 
confinement is void and has therefore vacated the conviction and sentence of a prisoner, 
it would be fundamentally unfair to expect the (now former) prisoner to defend the 
district court's ruling in this Court pro se. 
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The State attempts to avoid this result by arguing that Mr. Ford does not have a 
liberty interest because, "if the State succeeds [on appeal], it will result merely in 
reinstating the already imposed punishment." (Second Br. at 30.) This analysis, 
however, ignores the fact that the right to counsel attaches in probation (and likely 
parole) revocation hearings, even though they are merely reinstating an already imposed 
punishment. In addition, the district court's order releasing Mr. Ford is certainly final 
enough to bestow a liberty interest. If all legal proceedings ended today, Mr. Ford would 
remain free because his conviction and sentence have been vacated. That makes Mr. 
Ford's liberty interest at least as great as that of a parolee or a defendant on probation, 
both of whom still have criminal convictions in place and both of whom are recognized 
to have a liberty interest sufficient to trigger a federal right to due process. Article I, 
section 7 provides no less protection. 
Regardless of whether these proceedings are labeled as "civil" or "criminal," 
Mr. Ford has a right to counsel under the Utah Constitution. This Court should affirm. 
C. Mr. Ford Has a Right to Counsel Under the IDA Because the State is 
Invoking the Judicial Process to Deprive Mr. Ford of His Liberty 
Mr. Ford also has a statutory right to counsel under the Indigent Defense Act. 
Mr. Ford agrees with the State that the IDA is designed to "bring Utah into compliance 
with its federal constitution obligations." (Second Br. at 16.) As set forth above, Mr. 
Ford does have a federal constitutional right to counsel, and therefore, the IDA should be 
read to bring the State into compliance with that obligation. 
Consistent with the right to counsel under the United States Constitution, the IDA 
requires that legal counsel be provided "for each indigent who faces the substantial 
probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (1). 
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This plain language describes precisely what Mr. Ford—an indigent—faces. The State 
argues that this language does not apply because it is limited to deprivations of liberty 
"that will follow from a criminal conviction." (Second Br. at 13.) However, even this 
narrow reading is satisfied here: If the State succeeds on appeal, its legal basis for 
sending Mr. Ford to prison is a criminal conviction. 
The State next argues that the language does not apply because section 77-32-
301(6) excludes from the IDA's reach "subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary 
writ proceedings." (Second Br. at 14.) However, this appeal is neither a "subsequent 
discretionary appeal" nor a "discretionary writ proceeding." This appeal is not 
discretionary because the State had a right to appeal and this writ proceeding is no longer 
discretionary as to Mr. Ford because the State is the only party that wishes to proceed. 
To avoid this problem, the State cites to Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608 (Utah 
1994) for the proposition that the statutory right to counsel does not attach when 
defending against the State's appeal. (Second Br. at 15.) However, not only was 
Gardner a plurality opinion, it also did not address the issue of the right to counsel in the 
circumstances presented here, as it involved the right to state-funded post-conviction 
experts and investigators. Although the appeal was taken by the State in Gardner, 
Gardner was not requesting paid counsel on appeal or for paid investigators for the 
appeal. Rather, he argued that when he filed for post-conviction relief, he should have 
been entitled to paid investigators. The court determined that, because of the 
discretionary nature of the post-conviction petition, Gardner was not entitled to paid 
investigators or experts, but that under certain circumstances a post-conviction petitioner 
could be entitled to state compensated investigators and experts. Id at 622 & n.5. Again, 
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this analysis does not apply to Mr. Ford's request for paid counsel after the State 
appealed his successful post-conviction petition. Mr. Ford's participation in this appeal is 
in no way discretionary. Thus, Gardner provides no support for the State's position. 
The State also attempts to avoid the plain language of the IDA by contending that 
the IDA applies only to criminal cases. Mr. Ford will not repeat the arguments made 
previously to rebut this contention. It is sufficient to point out that the IDA applies to 
juvenile proceedings, which are civil proceedings. The important consideration is 
whether the State is attempting to deprive an indigent's liberty by imprisoning him for 
having committed a crime. Again, this is precisely what the State seeks to do here. 
The State's also attempts to avoid the plain language of the IDA by arguing that a 
provision in the Post-Conviction Relief Act governs instead. (Second Br. at 18-19.) The 
PCRA provides that a district court may "appoint counsel on a pro bono basis" to 
represent a petitioner who files a non-frivolous petition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-
109(1). This section is entirely consistent with the IDA and does not supersede it, as the 
State suggests. (Second Br. at 18 n.3.) The PCRA provision addresses the appointment 
of counsel for the initial disposition of post-conviction petitions, and the IDA expressly 
excludes "discretionary writ proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(6). The very 
proceedings expressly excluded from the IDA—discretionary writ proceedings—are 
those covered by the PCRA. 
The Court should read these two statutes as harmonious, not as in conflict with 
one another. Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, ^|9, 94 P.3d 234 ("We 
read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter or related chapters."). The harmonious reading is 
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that the PCRA allows the district court to appoint counsel once it determines a post-
conviction petition is not frivolous; and once the district court grants relief by vacating 
the conviction and sentence, then the IDA applies because the indigent person now faces 
"the substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's [newly granted] liberty." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (1). The PCRA does not apply here. 
In addition to providing counsel for any indigent person facing a deprivation of 
liberty, the IDA also provides counsel where a constitutional right has been denied. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-32-304(3) ("assigned counsel for an indigent shall be entitled to 
compensation . . . [where] the indigent has been denied a constitutional right"). A 
plurality of the Utah Supreme Court recognized this in Gardner. Gardner v. Holden, 888 
P.2d 608, 622 n.5 (Utah 1994). Admittedly, the language in Gardner is dicta. However, 
Gardner is suggestive that the IDA should be read to mean what is says: Once the district 
court has determined an indigent person's constitutional rights were violated, the IDA 
recognizes a right to state compensated counsel. 
The State's final argument that the IDA is inapplicable here is that Mr. Ford did 
not satisfy the pre-requisites for the appointment of counsel under the IDA. (Second Br. 
at 20-22.) Even though the State repeatedly represents that it 'does not represent any" 
party that has standing to make this argument, (id at 21, 22 n.4, 23 n. 5), the State 
nonetheless spends four pages arguing that the district court (i) failed to notify the 
"responsible entity" under section 77-32-303(1) of the hearing at which it appointed 
The State suggests that there is no right to counsel until the State exhausts all appeals 
because the determination that Mr. Ford's constitutional rights were violated is not 
"final." (Second Br. at 17.) This cannot be correct. Plainly, once all appeals are 
exhausted, Mr. Ford would no longer need appointed counsel. And to wait to litigate the 
issue until that time would needlessly waste judicial resources. 
6471112 56 
counsel under the IDA and (ii) failed to find a compelling reason to appointing counsel 
other than SLDA, as required under section 77-32-303. (Second Br. at 20.) Both 
arguments fail on the merits, even if the State had standing to raise them. 
In the district court, the State represented that Salt Lake County was the 
responsible entity. (Second Br. at 22 n.4.) Now, it is not so sure, offering that perhaps 
SLDA is the responsible entity. (Second Br. at 21-22.) Regardless, both entities had 
notice of the hearing. 
The district court specifically found that the Salt Lake County District Attorney 
had notice of the hearing, and the district attorney, unlike counsel for the State, does 
represent Salt Lake County. (R. 417.) The State has cited to no authority that this notice 
was defective and has marshaled no evidence to demonstrate the factual finding was 
clearly erroneous. 
In addition, SLDA had notice. SLDA represented Mr. Ford before withdrawing 
due to a conflict of interest and therefore knew non-contracting counsel was going to be 
appointed. In addition, SLDA received the same notice as did the district attorney. (R. 
393.) Finally, if SLDA was the responsible entity, the only reason to notify it of the 
hearing would be to ensure there was a compelling reason to appoint counsel other than 
SLDA. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-303 (requiring notice to the proper entity "to consider 
the authorization or designation of the noncontract attorney or resource," including 
whether "there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a noncontracting 
attorney"). However, the district court had already allowed SLDA to withdraw due to a 
conflict of interest, and therefore, no further evidence from SLDA was required to 
determine whether there was a compelling reason to designate a noncontracting attorney, 
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as the district court had already determined there was. Even if the State had standing, its 
argument concerning notice to the responsible entity fails. 
The State's additional contention that a conflict of interest is not a compelling 
reason to require conflict counsel is puzzling. (Second Br. at 23.) The State speculates 
that SLDA's contract with Salt Lake County may preclude Mr. Ford's current counsel 
from serving as counsel. SLDA's contract is not in the record, and the State's 
speculation about it is irrelevant. In the end, the State has provided no reason to reverse 
the district court's ruling that Mr. Ford is entitled to counsel appointed under the IDA. 
Because with this appeal the State seeks to obtain the legal authority to deprive 
Mr. Ford of his current liberty interest by sending him to prison, Mr. Ford has a right to 
paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal under the United States Constitution, the 
Utah Constitution, and the IDA. The Court should affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ford served 13 years in prison for possession of a dangerous weapon, even 
though he was never provided a preliminary hearing under article I, section 13. The State 
concedes that failure to present a charge to a magistrate in a preliminary hearing 
precludes the trial court from obtaining subject matter jurisdiction. Here, Mr. Ford never 
received a preliminary hearing by a member of the judiciary, as required under article I, 
section 13. Therefore, his original trial court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction to 
convict and sentence him. The district court did not err when it vacated Mr. Ford's 
conviction and sentence. 
In addition, the legislature's delegation to a court commissioner the authority to 
conduct a preliminary hearing was unconstitutional under article V, section 1 and article 
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VII, section 1. Conducting a preliminary hearing is a non-delegable core judicial 
function, as magistrates enter final judgments and their bindover orders are immediately 
enforceable. For this additional reason, Mr. Ford's original trial court never obtained 
subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the commissioner had de facto judicial authority, Mr. 
Ford is still entitled to relief as the first citizen to bring it to the court's attention. This 
provides an alternative ground to affirm. 
Finally, the district court did not err in appointing paid counsel for Mr. Ford. With 
this appeal, the State is attempting to deprive Mr. Ford of his current liberty and to send 
Mr. Ford back to prison. The State's use of the judicial process to strip away such a 
fundamental liberty interest requires state-appointed counsel under the United States 
Constitution, the Utah Constitution, and the IDA. The Court should affirm. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2008. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Troyl>. BTooher 
Attorney for Solomon Lee Ford 
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Decision on Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief and State's 
Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Case No. 050909964 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
The court, having reviewed the papers filed by the respective parties and having listened 
to the oral arguments by Petitioner acting pro se and by Counsel for the Respondent, hereby 
renders this decision on the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the State's Motion to Dismiss 
the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
Procedural Background: 
On August 19, 1993, the State charged the Petitioner Solomon Lee Ford (hereinafter, 
"Ford" or ccthe Petitioner") with aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. Ford's preliminary hearing was held before then Commissioner Frances M. 
Palacios. Commissioner Palacios bound Ford over for trial on the criminal charges. A jury 
subsequently convicted Ford on the weapons charge. He was sentenced to prison where he now 
remains incarcerated. 
In March 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Ford's conviction in an unpublished 
opinion. State v. Ford, slip op. 940044-CA (March 21,1995). In that proceeding, Ford did not 
*The one appropriate respondent in this case is the State of Utah, which was not initially named, 
but was served. URCP 65C(h). The case title initially included Frances Palacios as Respondent. The 
court has changed the name of the Respondent as required by the rule. 
make any claim that his conviction was unlawful on the basis that he had been bound over by a 
Commissioner. 
On May 20, 1996, Ford filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. Third District 
Court case number 9600903799. Thereafter, he filed a second petition. Third District Court case 
number 970905132. In neither case did Ford include a claim that his conviction was illegal 
because he had been bound over by a Commissioner. Both petitions were dismissed. 
A third petition for post-conviction relief was filed on March 12, 1999. The district court 
in that case adopted the State's summary of the four claims made by Ford, including that "the 
commissioner lacked authority to preside at [Ford's] preliminary hearing." Again, the State 
moved to dismiss the petition, which motion was granted by the court (Case number 990902794, 
March 23, 2000, Hon. Judge Tyrone Medley) which concluded, among other things, that Ford's 
challenge to the court Commissioner's authority to preside at the preliminary hearing "did not 
present a challenge to the court's jurisdiction to try petitioner." The district court accepted the 
State's arguments and, therefore, ruled that Ford's claim was procedurally barred. The court also 
concluded that allowing a Commissioner (at that time) to preside at a preliminary hearing was 
not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority. 
Ford appealed that decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ford's claims 
were procedurally barred. Ford v. Kent Morgan, et al., case no. 20000187-CA (2000). The Utah 
Supreme Court denied Ford's petition for review. Ford v. Morgan, 20 P.3d 403 (Utah 2001). 
Neither court specifically addressed the jurisdictional issue which Petitioner attempted to raise. 
Parties' Current Contentions: 
The present petition is Ford's fourth bite at the apple. He again claims that his criminal 
conviction is void because a court Commissioner had no authority to bind him over to stand trial. 
In essence, Ford claims that in 1993 a court Commissioner could not lawfully preside at a 
preliminary hearing. Thus, Ford contends, he was not lawfully bound over, and thus, there was 
no jurisdiction for the trial court to proceed with the jury trial. Ford therefore claims that his 
conviction was improper and that he should now be released from custody. Ford asserts that 
although he raised a claim of no jurisdiction in his third petition, the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals never ruled on that issue. He contends that jurisdictional issues may be raised at any 
time and, in order to obtain a ruling, he does so again in this petition.. 
The State responds to Ford's contentions by arguing that Ford bears the burden of proving 
a jurisdictional defect, which the State claims he has not done. In the alternative, the State 
asserts that Ford is now procedurally barred from successfully pressing this claim. In support of 
this contention, the State notes that Ford raised the jurisdictional issue in his third petition and 
lost that claim in the district court. Moreover, he failed to raise the jurisdictional issue in his first 
two petitions even though he could have done so. 
2 
The State notes that in the third post-conviction proceeding it conceded that a defect in 
subject matter jurisdiction would overcome a procedural bar. In this proceeding, however, the 
State apparently disavows that concession and argues that Ford must demonstrate that a 
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be procedurally barred. See fn. 4, State's 
Supplemental Memorandum (Jan. 24,2006). 
In essence, Petitioner argues that a literal reading of Judge Medley's ruling leaves unclear 
whether or not, in considering the third petition for relief, the trial court found that Petitioner had 
raised a jurisdictional issue. While the decision states that "[a] commissioner, when presiding at 
a preliminary hearing, exercises none of the powers of a judge and does not function as a court of 
record", and thus concludes that cc[a]llowing a court commissioner to preside at a preliminary 
hearing is not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority", it does not address the 
question which Petitioner raises here. The problem which is alleged here is that the Legislature 
acting alone could not authorize Commissioners to function as magistrates presiding over 
preliminary hearings. The State's echo of Supreme Court characterization of the authority of 
magistrates as being non-judicial does not solve the problem. Further careful reading of Judge 
Medley's ruling reveals that the precise jurisdictional defect which this court is asked to analyze 
here was not adequately addressed earlier. 
In addition to its other arguments, the State further affirmatively argues that Ford has not 
established that the Commissioner lacked authority to preside at Ford's preliminary hearing. In 
support, the State begins this argument by admitting that Ford contends that because the Judicial 
Council's rules did not authorize a Commissioner to serve as a magistrate, the Commissioner 
lacked authority to do so in this case. The State also concedes that Utah Code Sec. 78-3-31(9) 
(1993)(addendum B) required the Judicial Council to establish rules detailing "the types of cases 
and matters commissioners may hear." Further, the State does not dispute that as of the time of 
Petitioner's preliminary hearing, no such rules had been adopted by the Judicial Council. But, 
the State asserts, "nothing in that legislation limits commissioners' duties to those described in 
any Judicial Council's rules." The State further notes that the term "magistrate" includes a court 
Commissioner. Supplemental Reply at fn. 4, p. 7, citing Utah Code 77-1-3(4) (1993). 
Additionally, the State argues that when Ford's Commissioner presided as a magistrate at 
his preliminary hearing, she was not unconstitutionally perfbrifiing a judicial function of a court of 
record. The State cites Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), and State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 299, 
303-04 (Utah 1998), for the proposition that the Supreme Court has recognized that 
Commissioners may perform functions that are "reviewable by a judge" because '^ultimate judicial 
power remains with the judge." The State argues also that in Ford's preliminary hearing, 
"ultimate judicial power" remained with the trial judge, who had authority to review the 
Commissioner's probable cause determination subsequent to the bindover and was not required to 
give any deference to the Commissioner's determination. Moreover^ the State notes that the 
Commissioner's actions were not even subject to appellate review until the district court judge has 
acted on them. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464,456-66 (Utah 1991). 
^ 
Discussion: 
The questions presented by this petition and motion to dismiss are (1) whether a 
Commissioner in 1993 had authority to preside over a preliminary hearing; (2) if the 
Commissioner did not have such authority, whether the bindover was lawful; and (3) if the 
bindover was not lawful, did the district court have jurisdiction to try the Petitioner for the alleged 
crimes. The ultimate question is thus a question of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional questions may 
indeed be raised at any time and should be raised (even sua sponte by the court). See, Petersen v. 
Utah Bd of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1151 (Utah 1995). 
As stated above, in considering the third petition, the trial court found that Petitioner "had 
not presented a challenge to the court's jurisdiction to try Petitioner." See decision of Hon. Judge 
Tyrone Medley in Case no. 990902794. In this fourth petition, the Petitioner has stated 
unequivocally that he is indeed challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court which tried him on 
the charges. This court has reviewed carefully the trial court's ruling on the third petition for 
relief as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that ruling. In this court's view, 
neither of those decisions specifically addresses the question raised by Petitioner concerning 
jurisdiction. 
In this proceeding the State "acknowledges that a preliminary hearing and bindover are 
'essential to a court's jurisdiction over a felony.'" State's Supp. Memo at 8. But, the State 
asserts that a "defect" in the preliminary hearing will not render a subsequent conviction void. Id. 
The State continues, contending that Ford "must establish that proceeding on a preliminary 
hearing before and being bound over by a person who lacked authority to do either equates to 
having no preliminary hearing at all." Id. To support its position, the State cites Salt Lake City v. 
Ohms, supra, where the Supreme Court found that the Legislature had unconstitutionally 
delegated judicial authority to court Commissioners. Id. at 48-52. In Ohms, the Court did not 
invalidate prior judgments entered by Commissioners because they had acted with "de facto 
authority." Id. at 853-55. The State tries to extend the ruling of the Court in Ohms to this case by 
arguing that the court Commissioner had de facto authority to preside at a preliminary hearing and 
thus, the resulting bindover should be treated as valid, just as the Commissioners' judgments were 
considered valid in Ohms. 
In determining the answer to the ultimate jurisdiction question presented here, it is 
appropriate to begin with reference to Utah Constitution Article I, Sec. 13, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall 
be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by 
a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State 
Hence, the right to a preliminary hearing by a magistrate in felony cases prior to binding the 
matter over for trial is a constitutional right. This constitutional Section is the foundation for an 
accused's right to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate. 
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The right to a preliminary examination is also set forth in the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See Rule 7(h)(1)—(2) (as of 1993): 
(h)(1) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and 
laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has 
the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. . . } 
(h)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to 
believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, 
that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. . . .3 
The right of an accused to a preliminary hearing has long been regarded as a "substantial" 
right. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 134 Pac. 632 (1915). 
The State in essence asserts that in 1993 it did not matter who conducted this 
constitutionally-required and rule-mandated proceeding, even though it is a fundamental 
cornerstone of criminal procedure. Notwithstanding the State's position, however, this court 
believes that a determination to bind over a defendant for trial is a crucial determination which has 
the potential to eventually subject a defendant to all of the issues present in a public criminal 
prosecution. The fact that such a determination may not be immediately appealable makes the 
role of the magistrate an even more important part of the process. Indeed, the fact that the 
magistrate's ruling may be reviewed by the trial court, does not make it any less significant. 
If, through legislation and without the oversight of the Judicial Branch, any person at all 
could be given the title of a "magistrate" to preside over a preliminary hearing, then the 
constitutional right to such a hearing as a part of the criminal prosecution process could become 
meaningless. Hence, to avoid the problem of holding preliminary hearings before an 
unauthorized (and perhaps incapable) person, the input of the Judicial Council was a prerequisite 
for the proper designation of a magistrate. The attempt of the Legislature, acting without 
concurrence of the Judiciary, to allow a court Commissioner to function as a magistrate in 
preliminary hearings could not be considered sufficient to grant proper authority to a 
Commissioner to so act. 
2
 The current Rule 7(h)(1) states: "If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant 
shall be advised of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to a 
preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the 
defendant bound over to answer in district court." 
3
 The language of this paragraph is now found in substance in Rule 7(I)(2). 
5 
Therefore, because it is necessary for a magistrate to serve only as approved by the 
Judiciary, it may be stated that a defendant charged with a felony has a right to a preliminary 
hearing before a "properly authorized" magistrate. 
This court thus accepts Petitioner's claim in this case that at the time of his preliminary 
hearing in 1993, the Legislature had improperly and unlawfully attempted to authorize 
Commissioners to function as magistrates in preliminary hearings. Petitioner correctly points out 
that this was done without authority of the Judicial Branch. 
In 1993, Utah Code Section 77-1-3 (4) provided: 
"Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of record or not of 
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance 
with Section 78-3-31. 
However, the 1993 version of Section 78-3-31 did more than describe the procedure and 
minimum qualifications for appointment of Commissioners. Additionally, it in effect purported to 
permit Commissioners to act with the authority of a magistrate in misdemeanor cases. See 
subsection (6). While Section 78-3-31(9) deferred to the Judicial Branch operating through the 
Judicial Council to establish rules "defining the duties and authority of court commissioners for 
each level of court they serve[,]" the Judicial Council, in 1993, however, had not established any 
rules defining the duties and authority of court Commissioners and specifically had not allowed a 
Commissioner to act as a magistrate in a preliminary hearing. 
In 1994, the Supreme Court perceived the potential for problems in allowing the 
Legislature to thus expand the powers of Commissioners without control by the Judicial Branch. 
In Salt Lake City v. Ohms, supra, the Supreme Court ruled that the pre-1995 Utah Code Section 
78-3-31 was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to vest ultimate power of courts of 
record in persons who have not been duly appointed as Article VIII judges pursuant to the 
requirements of the Utah Constitution. Specifically, the Court in Ohms found that the section 
violated the Utah Constitution by granting Commissioners the power to enter final judgments and 
impose sentences in criminal misdemeanor cases. The rejection by the Supreme Catift of this 
attempt by the Legislative Branch to dictate the manner in which Commissioners exercise their 
authority as magistrates casts a shadow upon the legislative landscape from which the authorizing 
statute in the present case emerged. 
In 1993, Commissioner Palacios conducted the preliminary hearing under the auspices of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-7-17.5, which at the time stated: 
In felony cases, only a judge or a commissioner of a court of 
record may conduct an initial appearance, preliminary examination, 
or arraignment. 
As already noted, in 1993 there were no rules established by the Judicial Branch (including the 
Judicial Council) which allowed a Commissioner to exercise authority as a magistrate presiding 
6 
over preliminary hearings.4 Indeed, the procedural rule which described how an accused's right to 
a preliminary hearing was to be carried out had no reference to Commissioner, but instead cited 
only to magistrates. See, Rule 7, Utah Rules of Crim. Proc. (1993). Without authorization by the 
Judicial Branch (including authorization by rule of the Judicial Council and tacit approval of the 
authorization in the Rules of Criminal Procedure) this provision in the Utah Code which dictated 
who and how a magistrate must exercise his or her authority in affording the protections 
guaranteed under Article 1, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution cannot be upheld as applied to 
Petitioner's case. 
Thus, this court believes that despite the fact that Section 77-1-3(4) included 
Commissioners within the term of "magistrate," to the extent that the Section, together with 
Section 78-7-17.5 purported to extend to a Commissioner the authority to function as a magistrate 
in preliminary hearings, which authority was not sanctioned by any Judicial Council rule, it was 
unconstitutional. Cf, Salt Lake City v. Ohms, supra. 
The State contends that despite the fact that the Commissioner in Ford's preliminary 
hearing was not authorized by rule of the Judicial Council to function as a magistrate presiding 
over such proceedings, the Commissioner nevertheless acted with de facto authority [citing Ohms, 
supra]. Again, this court cannot agree. The theory ofde facto authority does not fulfill the 
Petitioner's constitutional right to a preliminary hearing presided over by a properly authorized 
magistrate when charged with a felony. Unlike the determination ofde facto authority in Ohms, 
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants charged with felonies cannot and should not be 
swept away by an assertion of de facto authority. 
Thus, this court agrees with Petitioner that Commissioner Palacios lacked proper authority 
to preside over his preliminary hearing in 1993. Having reached this conclusion, the question then 
arises as to whether Petitioner either in essence waived his right to a preliminary hearing or 
whether the lack of the Commissioner's authority constituted a "defect" which was waived by 
Petitioner's failure to object to the matter when he first petitioned for post-conviction relief. 
There is no doubt that an accused may waive his right to a preliminary hearing. Utah 
Constitution Article I, Section 13; U.R.Cr.P. 7(g)(l)(1993); and^e , e.g. State v. AfgUelles, 2001 
UT 1, $53, 63 P.3d 73 L Such a waiver, however, must be knowingly, imtiltigesitly, aftd 
voluntarily done. Under Article I, Section 13, and Rule 7(g)(l)(l 993) such a waiver must also be 
with the consent of the State. It could be argued that when Petitioner (who was represented by 
counsel) proceeded to trial following the hearing before Commissioner Palacios, he effectively 
waived any objection to her lack of authority, and thereby waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing. 
This court, however, does not believe that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing before a properly authorized 
magistrate. The fact is, Petitioner insisted upon a preliminary hearing. Nor does this court 
This issue no longer exists inasmuch as presently preliminary hearings are conducted only by 
Article VIII appointed judges acting as magistrates. 
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believe that Commissioner Palacios' lack of authority to function as a magistrate constitutes a 
mere "defect/' as the State contends. Rather, from this court's perspective, it would appear that 
Petitioner was denied a fundamental right to have a preliminary hearing before a duly authorized 
magistrate. 
Without a properly authorized magistrate, there was no valid preliminary hearing. The 
proceeding before the Commissioner in this case wasn't subject to a mere "defect." The hearing 
was a nullity. Cf, State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125,71 P.2d 196 (1937), where the Court observed 
that a prosecution should not proceed absent the necessary findings by a magistrate who was 
vested by the Judiciary with authority to conduct the preliminary hearing on the subject charges. 
Without a valid preliminary hearing, there was no proper bindover to the district court, and the 
district court thus lacked jurisdiction to require Ford to proceed to trial. 
This petition was filed under Rule 65C, which is subject to the requirements of the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-35A-101 et seq. Section 78-35A-106 
establishes specific requirements regarding what matters are excluded from post-conviction relief. 
Section 106(l)(d) provides that a defendant is precluded from raising any ground for relief that 
"was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief." 
Although Ford attempted to raised the issues under consideration here in his third petition, 
no prior Court has yet addressed the issue. As noted above, jurisdictional issues can and should 
be raised at any time. The jurisdiction of various courts is established either directly by the 
constitution or by authority vested by the constitution in the Judicial Branch, including 
establishing the powers of its judicial and quasi-judicial officers. To interpret the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act as precluding the issue raised in this petition would be nothing less than to exalt 
that statutory provision above a right created in the Utah Constitution. As was the case in Ohms, 
supra, "it was not within [Ohms'] power to invest by a 'waiver' the right to perform core judicial 
duties in persons to whom that right has not been granted by Article VIII, section 4." Id at 853. 
Similarly, it is not within the Legislature's power to divest a petitioner of his Article I, Section 13, 
right to a preliminary hearing before a properly authorized magistrate, either by granting authority 
to individuals not authorized to act by the Judicial Branch, or through operation of the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. 
If the trial court had ruled in Ford's previous case that the legislature is authorized to 
delegate the authority to preside over preliminary hearings without the approval of the Judicial 
Branch, or if the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court had ruled on this precise jurisdictional 
issue when the matter was on review, then of course this court would be governed by such a 
ruling. This did not happen, however, and thus, there is no procedural bar in effect with respect to 
this issue. 
Consequently, in the opinion of this court, Petitioner was wrongfully bound over for trial 
and the trial court was without jurisdiction to try him. The question remains, however, whether 
(as suggested by the State) the Petitioner is entitled merely to a new trial, or whether (as 
demanded by Petitioner) he is entitled to immediate release. Since this particular question has 
not been fully briefed, the court hereby requests that the State file a brief on this question within 
si 
30 days from the date of this Decision. Petitioner shall then have 30 days to respond, and the 
State an additional 10 days to reply. 
Because Petitioner remains impecunious, the court appoints Legal Defense Association to 
represent him in these proceedings. 
Dated: April 25,2006 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Solomon Lee Ford 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLOMON LEE FORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
JA< 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 050909964 
Honorable John Paul Kennedy 
Solomon Lee Ford's Motion for Hearing to Appoint Counsel Under the Indigent Defense 
Act and to Declare Appointed Counsel is Entitled to Compensation for Representing Mr. Ford 
(the "Motion") was heard on May 31, 2007. Troy L. Booher and Emily Smith Hoffman 
appeared for Petitioner Mr. Ford, and Thomas Brunker appeared for the State. 
Having reviewed and considered the parties' written memoranda and oral arguments, 
having weighed and considered the evidence received at the hearing on the Motion, and after 
considering such other and further matters as the Court deems appropriate, the Court hereby 
FINDS, CONCLUDES, and ORDERS as follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Procedural Background 
1. On April 25, 2006, the Court granted Mr. Ford's petition for post-conviction 
relief, ruling that Mr. Ford "was wrongfully bound over for trial and the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to try him." (4/25/2006 Order at 8.) As a result, the Court vacated Mr. Ford's 
sentence and conviction. (Id.) The Court also ruled that it would appoint Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders ("SLDA") to represent Mr. Ford because he was indigent. (Id. at 9.) 
2. After briefing from both the State and Mr. Ford, on August 15, 2006, the Court 
ordered Mr. Ford's immediate release from prison. (8/15/2006 Order.) 
3. The State has appealed the Court's April 25, 2006 ruling that granted Mr. Ford's 
petition for post-conviction relief. (7/10/2007 Notice of Appeal.) 
4. On February 2, 2007, SLDA moved to withdraw as counsel due to a conflict of 
interest. (2/2/2007 Motion to Withdraw as Court-Appointed Counsel.) On March 6, 2007, the 
State stipulated to entry of an order substituting Mr. Booher as counsel, but objected to any 
appointment that was other than pro bono, (3/5/2007 Response to Motion for Entry of Order 
Approving Substitution of Counsel.) March 19, 2007, the Court entered an order appointing Mr. 
Booher as counsel for Mr. Ford, but did not rule on the issue of whether Mr. Booher would serve 
as paid counsel. (3/19/2007 Order.) 
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5. On March 12,2007, Mr. Ford filed a motion to have Mr. Booher appointed as 
paid counsel. (3/12/2007 Motion for Paid Counsel.) On April 2,2007, the State opposed the 
Motion. (4/2/2007 Memorandum in Opposition.) This Motion was heard on May 31, 2007. 
II. Mr. Ford Remains Indigent 
6. The Court's April 25, 2006 finding that Mr. Ford is indigent remains in place, as 
Mr. Ford still cannot afford counsel to represent him in response to the State's appeal. The Court 
bases this finding on the following evidence: 
7. Between March 1993 and August fr995; Mr. Ford was incarcerated in the Utah 
State Prison with no means of earning any significant income. (Ford Aff. at |^3.) At the time the 
Motion was filed, Mr. Ford worked in the warehouse at Kimball Equipment Company, mostly 
operating a forklift. (Ford Aff. at %5.) Mr. Ford's job pays him $870 every two weeks and is his 
only source of income. (Id.) Mr. Ford owns no real property, has no savings, and does not have 
a sufficient credit history to borrow significant sums of money. (Id.) 
8. Of the $1,740 Mr. Ford earns every month, $432 is deducted to pay taxes, $400 is 
used to pay rent, and $200 is used to support Mr. Ford's son, Dejuan Ford. (Ford Aff. at [^6.) In 
addition, Mr. Ford spends approximately $400 per month on food and $100 on clothing, mostly 
for his work, which leaves approximately $208 per month that is discretionary. (Id.) 
9. Mr. Ford's $208 per month in discretionary income is not sufficient to pay for 
legal counsel in light of the likely costs in defending against the State's appeal. The likely cost 
to respond to the State's appeal is between $15,000 and $45,000. (Sherman Aff. at f6.) 
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10. Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Ford is indigent because he does not have 
sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to provide for the payment of legal counsel and 
all other necessary expenses of representation without depriving Mr. Ford or his family of food, 
shelter, clothing, and other necessities. 
11. Mr. Ford's status as indigent has not changed since the Court first determined he 
was indigent on March 25, 2006. 
HI. The County Had Notice of the Motion and Hearing 
12. At the time of the hearing, the Court was aware of the contract between SLDA 
and Salt Lake County to provide legal services for the indigent. 
13. On April 9, 2007, Mr. Ford served all papers relevant to the Motion on the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney. (4/9/2007 Certificate of Service.) 
14. At the hearing, Mr. Booher represented to the Court that his office had mailed a 
copy of the Notice of Hearing to the Salt Lake County District Attorney on or about May 5, 
2007. The Court finds that such notice of the hearing was in fact sent to the County. 
15. The County was properly notified of the indigency determination at issue during 
the May 31,2007 hearing as well as the hearing itself. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. Mr. Ford is Entitled to Paid Counsel Under the Indigent Defense Act 
1. Under the Indigent Defense Act, "indigency" is defined as "a person [who] does 
not have sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to provide for the payment of legal 
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counsel and all other necessary expenses of representation without depriving Mr. Ford or his 
family of food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32~202(3)(a). In 
determining whether a person is indigent, courts must consider the probable expense and burden 
of defending against the State; any ownership of, or interest in, any tangible or intangible 
personal or real property or reasonable expectancy of any such interest, the amounts of any 
debts; the number and ages of any dependents; and any other relevant factors. Id. at 77-32-
202(3)(b). Based upon the facts presented with the Motion and at the Hearing, Mr. Ford remains 
indigent. 
2. Under the Act, an indigent is entitled to paid counsel when he "faces the 
substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-
301(1). Because Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence were vacated, the State's appeal poses a 
substantial probability of depriving Mr. Ford of a liberty interest. Therefore, Mr. Ford is entitled 
to paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal under section 77-32-301(1). 
3. Under the Act, an indigent is also entitled to paid counsel to prosecute "remedies 
before or after conviction, considered by defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except 
for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-32-301(6). This language permits Mr. Ford paid counsel to pursue a post-conviction 
remedy insofar as the proceedings are not discretionary as to Mr. Ford. Because it is the State, 
not Mr. Ford, that has chosen to appeal the Court's ruling and challenge the current status quo, 
the appeal is not a discretionary proceeding as to Mr. Ford. Therefore, Mr. Ford is entitled to 
paid counsel to defend against the Staters appeal under section 77-32-301(6). 
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4. The Act applies in the post-conviction setting even though it has the formal label 
of "civil," as such labels do not determine whether the right to counsel attaches. In re Gault 387 
U.S. 1,19, 36 (1967). 
5. Under the Act, assigned counsel is entitled to compensation if "the indigent has 
been denied a constitutional right." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-304(3)(b)(i). In granting Mr. 
Ford's petition for post-conviction relief, the Court vacated Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence, 
ruling that Mr. Ford was denied his constitutional right under article I section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution to be "prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate." Therefore, Mr. Ford is entitled to paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal 
under section 77-32-304(3)(b)(i), which applies in the post-conviction setting. Gardner v. 
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 622 n.5 (Utah 1994). 
6. The Post Conviction Relief Act does not control whether Mr. Ford is entitled to 
paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal, but instead merely provides that a court "may, 
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-109(l). The PCRA does not preclude appointment of counsel under the Act and 
does not conflict with the appointment of paid counsel under the Act. The PCRA addresses the 
appointment of counsel for the initial disposition of post-conviGtion petitions, whereas the Act 
expressly excludes "discretionary writ proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(6). The very 
proceedings that are expressly excluded from the Act are those covered the PCRA. Therefore, 
section 78-35a-109(l) does not control the issue presented here. 
7. Section 78-35a-109(l) does demonstrate, however, that the prior appointment of 
SLDA was pursuant to the Act and not the PCRA, as this section prohibits the appointment of 
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counsel who "represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal/' which SLDA did in this 
case. 
8. Under the Act, to appoint non-contract counsel, such as Mr. Booher, a court first 
must set the matter for a hearing, provide notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible 
county, and make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a non-contracting 
attorney. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32-302(2)(e) and -303. The Act defines a "compelling reason" 
as "a conflict of interest." Id at § 77-32-201(2). Because SLDA had to withdraw as counsel due 
to a conflict of interest, there is a compelling reason to appoint non-contracting counsel such as 
Mr. Booher. The Court set the matter for a hearing on May 31, 2007, and the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney had notice of the hearing. The elements of sections 77-32-302(2)(e) and 77-32-
303 are satisfied, and the Court therefore appoints Mr. Booher as paid counsel under the Act. 
II. Mr- Ford is Entitled to Paid Counsel Under the Utah Constitution. 
9. Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." This provision guarantees 
"fundamental fairness" during court proceedings. Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ^29, 122 P.3d 
628. Because Mr. Ford has a fundamental liberty interest of which the State is attempting to 
deprive him, and because the State has paid counsel to prosecute its appeal, fundamental fairness 
requires that Mr. Ford also have paid counsel to defend against the State's appeal. 
10. Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides the right to counsel in 
criminal prosecutions. Because Mr. Ford faces prison if the State is successful on appeal, the 
State's appeal is functionally equivalent to an original criminal prosecution and the right to 
counsel attaches. 
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11. The right to paid counsel under article I, section 12 applies even though this 
proceeding is post-conviction because if the State is successful in its appeal, Mr. Ford will be 
punished by being sent back to prison. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167-69 (Utah 
1988) (explaining that whether a contempt proceeding is criminal or civil depends upon whether 
the purpose is to impose punishment). Therefore, Mr. Ford has a right to paid counsel under 
article I, section 12. 
III. Mr. Ford Has A Right To Paid Counsel Under The Federal Constitution. 
12. Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, one accused of a 
crime has the right to the assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has held that 
this right attaches to all critical stages of original criminal proceedings that could result in 
imprisonment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25 (1972); including a first appeal of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). 
For a discretionary appeal following an affirmance of a conviction in a first appeal of right, the 
right to counsel does not attach because the subsequent appeal is discretionary on the part of the 
person accused of a crime.1 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). However, where 
a first appeal of right is successful, and the State petitions for discretionary review, the right to 
counsel does attach because the proceeding is not discretionary as to the person whose liberty 
interest is in jeopardy. Blankenship v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 1997). Similarly 
here, it is the State, not Mr. Ford, that has exercised its discretion to appeal, an appeal that could 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly linked the rationale for why there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings and in discretionary appeals from 
the initial right to appeal a criminal conviction. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,275 (2000). 
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result in Mr. Ford's imprisonment, and therefore, Mr. Ford's Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches. 
13. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no state may 
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The United States Supreme Court 
has interpreted these provisions to require a state to provide financial assistance, including 
counsel, when a state seeks to deprive a person of a fundamental liberty interest.2 
14. While a number of such cases involve original criminal proceedings, the label of 
"criminal" is irrelevant to whether the right itself attaches. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967). 
15. Also, the fact that many of these cases involve the payment for resources (such as 
a transcript) instead of attorney fees makes no difference, as just as a transcript may by rule or 
custom be a prerequisite to appellate review, the services of a lawyer will for virtually every 
layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the 
merits. Where there is a fundamental right in jeopardy, a state has an obligation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to provide resources, including paid counsel, sufficient to permit one to 
defend that fundamental right. Because the State seeks to send Mr. Ford to prison with its 
appeal, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the appointment of paid counsel to represent 
Mr. Ford. 
Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requirement of criminal defendant to procure trial 
transcript in order to appeal in essence "bolt[ed] the door to equal justice"); Bums v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252, 253 (1959) (filing fee for motion for leave to appeal from judgment of intermediate 
appellate court to State Supreme Court must be waived when defendant is indigent); Smithy. 
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee to process state habeas corpus application must be 
waived for indigent prisoner). 
445504 9 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated above and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr, Ford's Motion for Hearing to Appoint Counsel 
Under the Indigent Defense Act and to Declare Appointed Counsel is Entitled to Compensation 
for Representing Mr. Ford is hereby GRANTED; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Booher is hereby appointed paid counsel to 
represent Mr. Ford in response to the State's appeal in this case under the Indigent Defense Act, 
article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Booher is to serve a copy of this Order on Salt 
Lake County; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is to send a copy of this Order to 
Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code section 77-32-202(4). 
DATED this ^ day of June, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
445504 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This will certify that on the day of June, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be served on the following by depositing the same in the United States mail, first 
class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Thomas B. Brunker 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association 
424 East 500 South, #300 
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210 COUNTIES—CLAIMS AND WARRANTS. 
been actually rendered, and, before allowance, such claims must be presented to 
the county attorney, who must indorse thereon, in writing, his opinion as to the 
legality thereof. If the county attorney declare the claim illegal, he must state 
specifically wherein it is illegal, and the claim must then be rejected by said 
board. [0. L. § 204* j '96, p. 536*. 
5 3 6 . Officers n o t to a d v o c a t e c l a i m s of others . No county officer 
shall, except for his own services, present any claim, account, or demand for 
allowance against the county, nor in any way advocate the relief asked in the 
claim or demand made by any other. Any person may appear before the board; 
and oppose the allowance of any claim or demand made against the county. 
['9(1, p. 534. 
537. Warrants. Form. Payment. Registration. County charges' 
t o be a u d i t e d . Warrants drawn by order of the board of county commissioner 
on the county treasury for current expenses during each year, must specify tlT 
liability for which they are drawn, when they accrued, and the funds from which: 
they are to be paid, and must be paid in the order of presentation to the treasurer 
If the fund is insufficient to pay any warrant, i t must be registered, and there-, 
after paid in the order of registration. Accounts for county charges of every 
description must be presented to the board of county commissioners, to be audited 
as prescribed in this title. [C. L. §§ 200, 208; '96, pp. 535, 570. 
W a n ant must specify liability, \ 606 Registering warrants, \ 557. 
5 3 8 . C o u n t y charges , w h a t are. The following are county charges: 
1. Charges incurred against the county by virtue of any of the provisions o 
this title. 
2. The necessary expenses of the county attorney, incurred in criminal cas 
arising in the county, and all other expenses necessarily incurred by him in th„ 
prosecution of criminal cases. 
3. The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged wit 
or convicted of crime and committed therefor to the countyjail . 
4. The sums required by law to be paid to jurors in civil cases. 
5. The accounts of justices of the peace acting at inquests. 
6. All charges and accounts for services rendered by any justice of the pe 
for services in the trial and examination of persons charged with crime, not oth 
wise provided for by law. 
7. The necessary expenses incurred in the support of the county hospital, 
poorhouses, and the indigent sick and otherwise dependent poor, whose suppo 
is chargeable to the county. * 
8. The contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit o 
the county. i 
9. Every other sum directed by law to be raised for any county purpose-
under the direction of the board of county commissioners, or declared to be* 
county charge. 
10. The fees of constables for services rendered in criminal cases. 
11. The necessary expenses of the sheriff and his deputies incurred in ciyi 
and criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses necessaril 
incurred by such sheriff or his deputies in the performance of the duties impose 
upon them by law. .. 
12. The sums required by law to be paid by the county to jurors and wi 
nesses serving at inquests and in criminal cases in justices' courts. ['96, i>-
570-1*. , „ 
Boaid to settle and allow accounts, k 511, sub 7, tendance of jurors in civil cases Salt Lake Coim 
^ 531 v Richaids, 14 U 142; 46 P 659 
The state is not lequircd to pay mileage and at-
539. Costs on removal of criminal action before trial. When 




> 5 4 0 . El ig ib i l i ty . No person is eligible to & county, district, or precinct 
Office, who, at the time of his election, is not an elector of the county, district, or 
*
:recinct in which the duties of the office are to be exercised. ['96, p. 537. 
) 5 4 1 . Officers enumerated . The officers of a county are : three county 
commissioners, a county treasurer, a sheriff, a county clerk, a county auditor, a 
"ounty recorder, a county attorney, a county surveyor, an assessor, a county 
Uperintendent of district schools, and such other officers as may be provided by 
"w; provided, that in counties having an assessed valuation of less than twenty 
'llions of dollars, the county clerk shall be ex officio auditor of the county and 
all perform the duties of such office without extra compensation therefor. P96, 
, 537*. 
Salaries of county officers, '$ 2056-2063. 
5 4 2 . Conso l idat ion of offices. I n counties where the board of county 
mmissioners, by proper ordinance shall so elect, the duties of the above men-
^oned officers niaj' be consolidated in such manner as the board may decide; and 
counties where the duties of said officers have been or may hereafter be con-
blidated, the board of county commissioners thereof, by proper ordinance, may 
lect to separate the duties so consolidated and reconsolidate them in any other 
aimer, or may separate said duties without reconsolidation and provide that 
e duties of each office shall be performed by a separate person, whenever, in 
eir discretion, the public interest will be best subserved thereby; provided, that 
b such ordinance shall be passed to take effect within less than three months 
*ter the passage thereof, and every such ordinance shall take effect on the first 
"onday of January next succeeding a general election. ['96, p. 537*. 
alaiy when offices consolidated, g 2063. 
5 4 3 . Id. D u t i e s of person se lected. When offices are united and 
nsolidated, but one person shall be elected to rill the offices so united and con-
lidated, and he must take the oath and give the bond required for and 
'scharge all the duties pertaining to each. ['96, p. 537. 
544 . Prec inc t officers. The officers of a precinct are one justice of the 
eace and one constable. The board of county commissioners of each county, as 
blic convenience may require, shall divide their respective counties into pre-
s e t s for the purpose of electing justices of the peace and constables. P96, pp. 
" 7-8*. 
ower to change oi abolish precincts, \ 511, subs. 1, 2. 
545. Elections. Terms. Oanvass of vote for county superin-
Indent. All elective county and precinct officers, except otherwise provided 
r in this title, shall be elected at the general election to be held in November, 
hteen hundred and ninety-eight, and every two j^ears thereafter, unless other-
Be herein provided, and shall take office at twelve o> clock meridian on the first 
nday in January next following the date of their election. Commissioners 
all be elected as hereinbefore provided. All officers elected under the provis-
os of this title shall hold office until their successors are elected or appointed 
d qualified. The judges of election in each school district in which electors 
e entitled to vote for county superintendent of schools, shall canvass the ballots 
t for such officer in such district, and certify the result to the county clerks of 
212 COUNTIES—OFFICERS. 
and shall issue to the person receiving the highest number of votes cast at said 
election for said office, a certificate of election. ['96, p. 538*. 
Election of county officers, tie vote, etc., \\ 781, 
787 Vacancies filled by county hoard, § 511, sub. 
5. Election of county superintendent, £ 1782. 
Under an act of congress vacating offices, etc., 
the governor might appoint a successor to the 
defendant, a probate judge, elected m 1880 for 
t he t enn of twoyeais and until his successor should 
be elected and qualified, no successor having been 
elected m 1882 in consequence of the provisions of 
an act of congress. Wenner v. Smith, 4 U. 2 
OP. 293. 
'Under section2018, pioviding that an incumbent 
of an office shall hold until his successor be duly 
elected or appointed and qualified, one holding by 
appointment will hold over for the succeeding 
term, if no election occurs at the time provided 
for by statute People, ex rel. Murphy, v. Haidy, 
8 U. 68; 29 P 1118. 
5 4 6 . D e p u t i e s and a s s i s t a n t s . Every county, precinct, or district 
officer, except a county commissioner or a judicial officer, may, by and with the 
consent of the board of county commissioners, appoint as many deputies and 
assistants as may be necessary for the prompt and faithful discharge of the duties 
of his office. The appointment of a deputy must be made in writing, and filed in 
the office of the county clerk, and, until such ap]:>ointment is so made and filed 
and until such deputy shall have taken the oath of office, no one shall be or act 
as such deputy; provided, that any officer appointing any deputy shall be liable for 
all official acts of such deputy; and provided farther, that the board shall allow the 
county clerk such deputies and assistants to transact the business pertaining to 
the district courts as may be deemed necessary and advisable by the judge or 
judges of the district court. ['96, pp. 538*, 559*. 
5 4 7 . " P r i n c i p a l " i n c l u d e s " deput ie s ." Whenever the official name 
of any principal officer is used in any law conferring power or imposing duties or 
liabilities, it includes deputies. ['96, p. 539. 
Puncipal may include deputy, £ 2498, 
5 4 8 . Offices a t c o u n t y s e a t s , w h e n . The clerks, recorders, and treas-
urers of all counties, and, except in counties having a population of less than 
eight thousand, all other county officers, must have their offices at the county-
seats; and in counties having a population of twenty thousand and over, the4 
clerk, sheriff, recorder, auditor, treasurer, and attorney must keep their office 
open for the transaction of business from nine o'clock a. m. until -five o'clock 
p. m. ['96, p. 539. 
5 4 9 . L iab i l i ty on bond. "Whenever, except in criminal prosecutions^ 
any special penalty, forfeiture, or liability is imposed upon any officer for non< 
performance or mal-performance of his official duties, the liability therefoi 
attaches to the official bond of such officer and to the principal and sureti 
thereon. 
Sup. Cal Codes (1893) p 607. Mont. Pol. C. }, 4324. 
5 5 0 . Officer a b s e n t from c o u n t y . No county officer shall absent him 
self from the county for a period of more than thir ty days without the consent o 
the board of count3' commissioners. ['96, p. 539. 
5 5 1 . B o n d s of c o u n t y officers. A p p r o v a l . Suret ies . Recording. 
The board of county commissioners of each county in the state shall prescribe by3 
ordinance the amount in which the following county and precinct officers sliall^  
execute official bonds before entering upon the discharge of the duties of their 
respective offices, viz: county treasurer, county clerk, county auditor, sheriff, 
county attorney, recorder, assessor, county surveyor, county superintendent of 
district schools, justice of the peace, and constable; provided, that the bond 
of the county treasurer shall not be fixed in an amount less than one-half the, 
total amount of the taxes collected in the county during the preceding year. The 
judge or judges of the distinct court shall prescribe the amount in which eaclr" 
member of the board of county commissioners must execute an official bond before; 
entering upon the discharge of the duties of his office. The bonds and sureties. 
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 trict court. The bonds and sureties of all other county and precinct officers must 
, be approved by the board of county commissioners before they can be filed and 
' recorded. All persons offered as sureties on official bonds shall be examined on 
oath touching their qualifications, and no person shall be admitted as surety 
r on any such bond unless he is a resident and freeholder within this state, and is 
worth, in real or personal property, or both, situate in this state, the amount of 
his undertaking, over and above all just debts and liabilities exclusive of prop-
erty exempt from execution. All official bonds shall be recorded in the office of 
the county recorder and then filed and kept in the office of the county clerk. 
The official bond of the county clerk, after being recorded, shall be filed and kept 
in the office of the county treasurer. [C. L. § 207*; '96, pp. 539-40*. 
Power to fir bonds and require renewal, £ 511, sub. 3. Official bonds generally, \\ 1682-1686. 
552. Officers to complete business at end of term. It shall be the 
-'duty of all officers in this title named, to complete the business of their respec-
tive offices to the time of the expiration of their respective terms; and, in case 
an officer at the close of his term shall leave to his successor official labor to be 
performed for which he has received compensation, or which it was his duty to 
'perform, he shall be liable to pay his successor the full value of such service, 
which may be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction. p96, pp. 568-9. 
CHAPTER 5. 
COUNTY TREASURER. 
5 5 3 . Dut ies . The county treasurer shall: 
1. Receive all money belonging to the county and all other money by law 
directed to be paid to hini, safely keep the same, and apply and pay it out, and 
tender an account thereof as required by law. 
2. Keep an account of the receipts and expenditures of all such money, in 
books provided for the purpose, in which must be entered the amount, the time 
?when, from whom, and on what account any money was received by him; the 
amount, time when, to whom, and on what account all disbursements were made 
y him. 
3. Disburse county money only on county warrants issued by the county 
auditor, except on settlements with the state. 
4. Disburse the money in the treasury on such warrants only when they are 
based on orders of the board of county commissioners, or upon order of the 
district court, or as otherwise provided by law. 
5. File and keep the certificates of the auditor delivered to him when 
'money is paid into the treasury. 
6. So keep his books that the amount received and paid out on account of 
separate funds or specific appropriations are exhibited in separate and distinct 
''accounts, and the whole receipts and expenditures shown in one general or cash 
account. 
7. Perform such other duties as are or may be required bv law. PC L 
101; >96, p. 540*. 
t Fees of treasurer, § 975. 
> 5 5 4 . Audi tor ' s certif icate t o a c c o m p a n y m o n e y . He must receive 
no money into the treasury except taxes unless accompanied by the certificate of 
the auditor provided for in chapter eight of this title. 
Sup. Cal. C. (1893) p. 609*. 
5 5 5 . M u s t g i v e receipt. When any money is paid into the county 
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holding said court. The stipulation must specify the place of trial or hearing, 
and must be filed in the office of the clerk. [C. L. §§ 3045-6. 
6 8 4 . J u d g e pro t e m p o r e . Any cause pending in a district court may 
be tried by a judge pro tempore, who shall be a member of the bar of the supreme 
court of the state. ['96, p. 94. 
Judge pro tempore, Con. art. 8, sec. 5. 
6 8 5 . Id. A p p o i n t m e n t . P o w e r s . Whenever all the parties to any 
cause pending in a district court or their attorneys of record shall enter into a 
written stipulation appointing a judge pro tempore for the trial of the cause, and 
the person appointed shall take and subscribe an oath to faithfully try and deter-
mine the issues joined between the party or parties plaintiff, naming them, and 
the party or parties defendant, naming them, and any other parties, if such there 
be, naming them, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in which such 
action is pending to attach together said stipulation and oath and to place them 
on file and also to record them at length upon the minutes of the court; where-
upon the person appointed shall be vested with the same power and authority 
and shall be charged with the same duties as to the cause in and as to which he 
is appointed as though he were the regularly elected and qualified judge of the 
district court; provided, that parties may, by the terms of their stipulation, limit 
the power of the judge pro tempore to the trial and determination of any speci-
fied issue or issues, either of law or fact, and in such case, the oath of the person 
appointed shall correspond to the terms of the stipulation. ['96, p. 94. 
6 8 6 . Id. C o m p e n s a t i o n . Judges pro tempore shall serve without com-
pensation from any public treasury, but it shall be lawful for the parties to agree 
upon and express in their written stipulation any mode or amount of compensa-
tion, together with any further agreement as to the taxing of the same as costs. 
['96, p. 94. 
CHAPTER 4. 
JUSTICES' COURTS. 
687. Place of residence and of holding court. Every justice of the 
peace shall reside in and shall hold a justice's court in the precinct or city for 
which he is elected; provided, tha t where more than one precinct is embraced 
within the limits of any incorporated city or town, the justices of the peac6 of 
such precincts may hold court at any place within their respective cities or towns. 
[C. L. §§ 3019*, 3042*; >97, p. 263. 
6 8 8 . Civil jur i sd ic t ion . The justices' courts shall have civil jurisdiction 
within their respective precincts or cities: 
1. In actions arising on contract for the recovery of money only, if the sum 
claimed is less than three hundred dollars. 
2. In actions for damages for injury to the person, or for taking or detain-
ing personal property, or for an injury to real property where no issue is raised 
by the answer involving the plaintiff's title to or possession of the same, if the 
damages claimed be less than three hundred dollars. 
3. In actions for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, less than three hundred dol-
lars, given by statute or by the ordinances of an incorporated city, where no issue 
is raised by the answer involving the legality of any tax, .impost, assessment, toll, 
or municipal fine. 
4. In actions upon bonds or undertakings conditioned for the payment of 
money, if the sum claimed is less than three hundred dollars, though the penalty 
m f l i r AYOAPrl •f-l-jQ'f d i m T\rV»nv> +-l-»n r\otrmfli-i+a a-»-»£i +r\ "kc* -ma/ lc . Tver -Jv» o fa l iv i cm+o o n 
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5. I n actions to recover the possession of personal property, when the value 
of such property is less than three hundred dollars. 
6. To take and enter judgment on the confession of a defendant, when tli€ 
amount confessed is less than three hundred dollars. [C. L. § 3020*. 
Jurisdiction, etc., Con. art. 8, sec. 8. Juriadic- warrant his conclusion. Marks v. Sullivan, 0 V 
tion of city justice under city ordinances. §239. 12; B3 P. 224. A justice of the peace canno 
Authority to impose a fine in any sum less than include in his judgment interest on the sui 
thTee hundred dollars and an imprisonment for a claimed from the time the suit was brought, if i 
term not exceeding six months, is in excess of the makes the total amount of the judgment excee jurisdiction which the legislature could confer on $300; but the allowance of such interest does nc justices of the peace under the organic act. Peo- deprive him of original jurisdiction so as to niak 
pie, ex rel. Yearian, v. Spiers, 4 u. 385; 11 P. 509. the judgment void and unappealable. On apper 
The legislature of the territory could confer on of such judgment the district court may alio-' justices of the peace no jurisdiction in criminal interest on the sum claimed,frorn the time the suit 
cases, except that usually exercised by such jus- brought, though the judgment, on account of sue 
tices of uhe peace at the date of the passage of the allowance, exceeds the amount for which the ju 
organic act. Id. Justices of the peace, under the tice could have rendered judgment. MeCormic 
statutes of the territory, have jurisdiction to try Har. Machine Company v. Marchant, 11 U. 68; J 
an offender charged with the crime of battery. P. 483. 
Overruling Yearian v. Spiers, 4 U. 385. People Jurisdiction of city justice is co-extensivc wit 
v. Douglass, 5 U. 283; 14 P. 801. A justice of the city. Saunders v. Sioux City N. Co., 6 U. 431; S 
peace acting within his jurisdiction is not liable for P. 532. 
mistakes of judgment, although the facts do not 
6 8 9 . Concurrent jurisdict ion. The justices' courts shall have concui 
rent jurisdiction with the district courts within their respective precincts an 
cities: 
1. I n actions of forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer, whei 
the whole amount of the rent and damages claimed is less than three hundre 
dollars. 
2. In actions to enforce and foreclose liens on personal property, where tr 
amount of the liens and the value of the property are each less than three hiu 
dred dollars. [C. L. § 3021. 
Questions of possession of real property may be or detainer actions. Hyndman v. Stowe, 9 U. i 
adjudicated by justices of peace in forcible entry 33 P. 227. 
6 9 0 . P r o c e s s to a n y part of c o u n t y . Mesne and final process 
justices' courts may be issued to anjr part of the county in which they are hel 
[C. L. § 3022. 
6 9 1 . Criminal jur isdict ion . Justices' courts have jurisdiction of tl 
following public offenses committed within the respective counties in wTii< 
such courts are established: 
1. Petit larceny. 
2. Assault or battery not charged to have been committed upon a pub] 
officer in the discharge of his duties, or to have been committed with such inte 
as to render the act a felony. 
3. Breaches of the peace, committing a wilful injury to property, and i 
misdemeanors punishable by a fine less than three hundred dollars, or by impr 
onment in the county jail or city prison not exceeding six months, or by bo 
such fine and imprisonment. [C. L. § 3023*. 
CHAPTER 5. 
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES. 
6 9 2 . W h e n disqualified. Except by consent of all parties, no justii 
judge, nor justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any action or proceedir 
1. To which he is a party, or in which he is interested. 
2. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within 1 
third degree, computed according to the rules of law. 
960 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
4 6 0 7 . Mag i s t ra te defined. A magistrate is an officer having power to 
issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense. 
Cal. Pen. (J. i 807; Mont. Pen. C. \ 1373. 
4 6 0 8 . M a g i s t r a t e s e n u m e r a t e d . The following persons are magis-
trates : 
1. The justices of the supreme court. 
2. The judges of the district courts. 
3. Justices of the peace. [C. L. § 4836*. 
Cal. Pen. C £ 80S*. 
4 6 0 9 . P e a c e officers e n u m e r a t e d . A peace officer is a sheriff of a 
county or his deputy, or a constable, or a marshal or policeman of any incorpo-
rated city or town. [C. L. § 5390. 
Mont. Pen. C. $ 1375*. 
CHAPTER 12 . 
COMPLAINT 
4 6 1 0 . W h a t a c o m p l a i n t m u s t s t a t e . The complaint must state: 
1. The name of the person accused, if known, or if not known and it is so 
stated, he may be designated by any other name. 
2. The county in which the offense was committed. 
3. The general name of the ciime or public offense. 
4. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the crime or public 
offense named. 
5. The person against whom, or against whose property the offense was 
committed, if known. 
6. If the offense is against the property of any person, a general descrip-
tion of such property. The complaint must be subscribed and sworn to by the 
complainant. 
N. Dak (1895) ^ 7886; Mont. Pen C $ 1590J\ man, 1 U. 39 Ciiminal complaint may be sworn to 
Complaint defined, <? 4604 upon information and belief tf. S. v Eldredge, 5 
Information or complaint must show that a eiime U. 161; 13 P. 673 
has been committed Matter of Catherine Wise* 
4611. Any person having knowledge must make complaint. 
Every person who has reason to believe that a crime or public offense has been 
committed, must make complaint against such person before some magistrate 
having authority to make inquiry of the same. 
N. Dak. (1895) ^ 7887, Mont Pen C. % 1591*. When person concealing crime an accessory, {J 4075. 
4 6 1 2 . M a g i s t r a t e m u s t e x a m i n e c o m p l a i n a n t . W i t n e s s e s . When 
a complaint is made beiore a magistrate, charging a person with the commission 
of a crime or public offense, such magistrate must examine the complainant, 
under oath, as to his knowledge of the commission of the offense charged, and he 
may also examine any other persons and may take their depositions. [C. L: 
§ 4837* 
N Dak. (1895) £ 7888; Mont Pen. C. £ 1592'*. made, 4 4630 Complaint, issuance of warrant, 
Complaint of commission of crime in another £4tfl5 
countv; accused being in county where compiamt 
4613. When arrest made without warrant complaint to be filed. 
When any officer or < ther person shall bring any peison he has arrested without 
a warrant before a magistiate, it is the duty of such officer or person to specify the 
charge upon which he has made the a n est. I t is then the duly of the magistrate 
or the county attorney to make a complaint of the offense charged, and cause the 
officer or person, or some other peison, t'> subscribe and make oaih to such com-
plaint, and file it. 
WAREANT OF AEEEST. 9( 
4614. Complainant must name witnesses. Subpoena. Evei 
person making complaint charging the commission of a crime or public offens 
must inform the magistrate of all persons whom he believes to have any knowled 
of its commission, and the magistrate, a t the time of issuing the warrant, mi 
issue subpoenas for such persons, requiring them to attend at a specified time ai 
plav e as witnesses. 
N. Dak. (1895) <5 7800; Mont. Pen. C. \ 1594. 
CHAPTER 13. 
WARRANT OF ARREST. 
4615. Issuance of warrant. Consent of county attorney. Wt 
acomnla nt, verified by oath or affirmation, is made before a magistrate, chargi 
the commission of a crime or public offense, he must, if satisfied therefrom that 1 
offense complained of has been committed, and that there is reasonable ground 
believe that the accused committed it, issue a warrant for his arrest; but wl 
the magistrate before whom the complaint is made is a justice of the peace, bef< 
issuing the warrant, the complaint, if made by any person other than the com 
attorney of the county, and other evidence taken by such magistrate relating to 
offense charged, must be submitted to such county attorney, and he must exa 
ine into the charge and enter either his approval or disapproval of the issuance 
a warrant upon such complaint. If the county attorney disapproves, no warr 
shall be issued, but if he approves the issuance of a warrant, such magistrate si 
proceed accordingly; provided, that in caces when it appears from statement? 
tLe complaint or other written evidence submitted to the magistrate that 
accused is likely to escape from the county before the approval of the cou 
attorney can be had, as hereinbefore prescribe,!, a warrant may issue without 
approval of the county attorney. No justice of the peace shall receive any 
or allowances whatever for any act done or services rendered in a criminal ad 
or proceeding commenced or prosecuted in disregard of the provisions of this 
tion. [O. L. § 4839*. 
N Dak (1895) ?/ 7891* 
Foim of complaint, ^ 4610. Magistrate defined, §4608. 
4 6 1 6 . W a r r a n t defined. F o r m . A warrant of arrest is an orde 
writing in the name of the state, signed by a magistrate, commanding the ar 
of the defendant, and may be substantially in the following form: 
STATE OF UTAH, ^ } 
COUNTY OF . j 
The state of Utah to any sheriff, constable, marshal, or policeman of said s1 
or of the county of : 
Complaint on oath having been this day made before me, by A B, thai 
crime of (designating i t ) , has been committed, and accusing C D thereof, yon 
therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above named C D, and bring 
before me at (naming the place) or in case of my absence or inability to act, b* 
the nearest or most acces ible magistrate in this county. Dated at 
day of , eighteen . 
When necessary, the magistrate may insert therein a clause to the effect 
if the accused has fled from justice, tha t the peace officer pursue him into 
-other county of this state and there arrest him. [C. L. § 4840. 
Cal. Pen. C. ^ 814'\ 
4 6 1 7 . Id. Requis i tes . The warrant must specify the name of the dei 
ant, or, if it is unknown to the magistrate, the defendant may be desigi 
+hArphi hv anv name. I t must also state the time of issuing it, and the cot 
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4649. Officer arresting with warrant must proceed lawfully, 
officer making an arrest in obedience to a warrant, must proceed with the perso 
arrested as commanded by the warrant, or as provided by law. [C. L. § 4866., 
Cal Pen C £ 848 
4650. Arrest without warrant. Delivery of prisoner. Complain 
When an arrest shall be made without a warrant by a peace officer or private p" 
son, the person arrested must, without unnecessary delay, be taken to the near 
or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and 
complaint, stating the charge against the person, must be made before such n r 
istrate. A conductor or other person who shall have made an arrest as provid 
in subdivision four of section forty-six hundred and thirty-eight, shall, witho 
unnecessary delay, take the person so arrested before any accessible magista 
or deliver him to a peace officer; and a complaint, stating the charge against i 
person, must be made before such magistrate; and the magistrate before wh 
such charge shall be made, if the offense is triable by him, shall have full jur 
diction over said offense and the defendant, to try and determine said offense. * 
he have not jurisdiction to t ry the defendant for the offense charged, he m 
proceed as provided in chapter sixteen of this title. [C. L. § 4867. 
Cal Pen C ^ 840*. 
Failure to take person arie&ted before magistrate without delay, a misdemeanor, ? 4139 
4651. Service of warrant by telegraph. Procedure. Any m* 
trate may, by an indorsement upon a warrant of arrest, authorize the ser 
thereof by telegraph, and thereafter a telegraphic copy of such warrant ma; 
sent by telegraph to one or more peace officers, and such copy is as effectu 
the hands of any officer, and he must proceed in the same manner under iti 
though he held an original warrant issued by the magistrate making the ind 
ment. [C. L. § 4868^ 
Cal Pen C i 850 * 
4 6 5 2 . Id. Cert i f icat ion a n d return. Every officer causing telegra 
copies of warrants to be sent, must certify as correct and file in the tele_ 
office from which such copies are sent, a copy of the warrant and indorse 
thereon, and must return the original with a statement of his action there" 
[C. L. § 4869. 
Cal Pen C \ 851 
4653. Officer may direct arrest by telegraph. In all cases wh 
law a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant, or, having a w~ 
for the arrest of a person accused of a public offense, and such person may 
wise escape from this state, such officer may, by telegraph, direct any sli 
constable, marshal, or policeman in this state to arrest such person, and des 
the accused in said order by name, or description, or both. 
N Dak (1895) § 7939 
4 6 5 4 . Id. Arres t a n d d e t e n t i o n of prisoner. The order 
directed generally to any of such officers, and executed by the officer rec 
it. The officer executing any such order shall take into liis custody the _ 
designated therein and detain him upon such order for such length of tf 
shall be necessary for the officer directing the arrest to reach the place of 
tion by the ordinary means and course of travel, or until sooner demand 
an officer having a warrant for the arrest of such person, but in no cas 
the officer arresting such person upon such order detain him longer th 
time hereinbefore mentioned. 
N Dak (1895) ? 7940 
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CHAPTER 15, 
RETAKING AFTER ESCAPE OR RESCUE 
4 6 5 5 . P u r s u i t a n d rearrest. If a person arrested escapes or is res-
, the person from whose custody he shall have escaped or shall have been 
cued, may immediately pursue and retake him at any time and in any place 
| r in the state. [C. L. § 4870. 
l l . Pen C ?854 
-lapes, U 4114-4118 Rescues, H 4112, 4113. Justifiable homicide in retaking felon, ? 41G7 
4656. Id. May break door or window. To retake the person escaping 
escued, the person pursuing may break open an outer or inner door or window 
dwelling-house or other building, if, after notice of his intention, he is 
sed admittance. [C. L. § 4871. 
, Pen C 4 855 
CHAPTER 16. 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
4657. Magistrate to inform prisoner of his rights. When the 
dant shall be brought before the magistrate upon an arrest, either with or 
out a warrant, on a charge of having committed a public offense, the magis-
must immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his right 
e aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings. [C. L. § 4872. 
£Pen C. \ 858. • Defendant by waiving preliminary examination 
Iit3 of accused peison, Con. art. 1, sees. 7-12, waives all defects in complaint again&t him U S 
\ v. Eldiedge, 5 TJ. 161; 13 P. 673. _ J 
4658. Time to procure counsel allowed. Message to counsel, 
ust also allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for counsel, and 
one the examination for that purpose, and must, upon the request of the 
dant, require a peace officer to take a message to any counsel in the pre-
or the city the defendant may name. The officer must, without delay and 
out fee, perform that duty. [C. L. § 4873. 
Pen. C. i 859. Eight to counsel, Con. art. 1, sec. 12 
'659 . E x a m i n a t i o n to be proceeded w i t h . At the time set for the 
g, the magistrate before whom the accused is brought must, unless a change 
ce of trial is had under the provisions of the next section, immediately 
the appearance of counsel, or if none appears, after waiting a reasonable 
therefor, if the accused requires the aid of counsel, proceed to examine the 
; [C. L. § 4874*. 
k. (1895) <>7952 
veT of prehminaiy examination with consent of state, Con. ait . l t sec. 13 
660. Change of place of trial. Affidavit. Transfer. Whenever 
on accused of a public offense is brought before a justice of the peace for 
nation and, at any time before such examination is commenced, he files 
•^ such justice his affidavit stating that by reason of the bias or prejudice of 
I justice he believes he cannot have a fair and impartial examination before 
such justice must transfer said action, and all the papers therein, including 
/'fied copy of his docket entries, to another justice of the same county; pro-
, that unless the parties agree upon the justice to whom said action shall be 
"erred, it shall be sent to the nearest justice of the county, but no more than 
change of the place of examination under this section shall be had in an 
n. 
k (1895) ^ 7953 
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4661. Limitation on postponement, unless by consent. The exam-
ination must be completed at one session, unless the magistrate, for good caus4 
shown, postpone it. The postponement shall not be for more than four days a1; 
each time, nor more than twelve daj^ s in all, unless by consent or on motion < * 
the defendant. [C. L. § 4875*. 
Cal. Pen C. ? 861* 
4662. Id. Defendant to give bail or be committed. If a postpone-
ment is had, the magistrate must commit the defendant for examination, admi 
him to bail, or discharge him from custody upon the deposit of money as provided 
in this code, as security for Ins appearance at the time to which the examination 
is postponed. [C. L. § 4876. 
Cal Pen C § 862 Bail, W 4983-5010. 
4663 . Fo rm of commi tment for examinat ion. The commitment fo* 
examination shall be made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate on tli* 
warrant of arrest, to the following effect: " The within named A B, having beeij 
brought before me under this warrant, is committed for examination to thesheri 
of ." If the sheriff be not present, the defendant ma}*- be committed 
the custody of any peace officer. [C. L. § 4877. 
Cal. Pen C. i 863 
4664. Magis t ra te m u s t issue subpoenas. The magistrate must issue; 
subpoenas, subscribed by him, for witnesses within the state, required either b 
the prosecution or the defense. [C. L. § 4878. 
Cal Pen. C. ? 864'*. 
Accused entitled to compulsory process for witnesses, Con. art. 1, sec. 12. 
4665 . Procedure on preliminary examination. At the examinati 
the magistrate must first read to the defendant the complaint and the deposition 
of the witnesses examined on making the complaint, if depositions were take 
[C. L. § 4878*. 
Cal. Pen. C. \ 864*. 
4666. Id. Examination of witnesses in presence of defendan 
The witnesses must be examined in the presence of the defendant, and may" 
cross-examined in his behalf. [C. L. § 4879. 
Cal. Pen C $ 885. 
Accused entitled to be confronted by witnesses, Con. art. 1, sec. 12; \ 4613. 
4667. Id. Examination of defendant's witnesses. When 
examination of witnesses on the part of. the state shall have closed, any witnes 
the defendant may produce may be sworn and examined. [C. L. § 4880. 
Cal. Pen C \ 886. 
4668. Id. Exclusion of witnesses. Keeping separa te . While? 
witness shall be under examination, the magistrate may exclude all witnes 
who shall not have been examined. He may also cause the witnesses to be k 
separate, and to be prevented from conversing with each other until they sh 
have all been examined. [C. L. § 4881. 
Cal Pen C $ 867. Exclusion of witnesses and others, \ 696. 
4669. Id. Exclusion of specta tors , etc., on request . The mag} 
trate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the examinati"' 
every person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the attorney ge; 
eral, the county attorney, the defendant and his counsel, and the officer havi 
the defendant in custody. 
Cal Pen. C. I 868. 
[C. L. § 4882*. 
4670. When t es t imony reduced to wri t ing. Fo rm of depositi 
The testimony of each witness in cases of homicide must be reduced to writing' 
a deposition, by the magistrate, or under his direction; and in other cases up" 
the demand of the prosecuting attorney. The magistrate before whom the ex~~ 
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timony and proceedings to be .taken down in shorthand, in all examinations 
erein mentioned, and for that purpose he may appoint a stenographer. The 
eposition or testimony of the witness must be authenticated in the following 
orm: 
1. I t must state the name of the witness, his place of residence, and his 
business or profession. 
2. I t must contain the questions put to the witness, and his answers thereto, 
h answer being distinctly read to him as it is taken down, and being corrected 
or added to until it conforms to what he declares is the truth; except that in cases 
$here the testimony shall be taken down in shorthand, the answer or answers of 
e witness need not be read to him. 
3. If a question put is objected to on either side and ovei^ruled, or the wit-
ess declines answering it, that fact, with the ground on which the question shall 
ave been overruled or the answer declined, must be stated. 
4. The deposition must be signed by the witness, or if he refuse to sign it, 
is reason for refusing must be stated in writing as he gives it, except that in 
Bases where the deposition shall be taken down in shorthand, it need not be 
*gned by the witness. 
5. It must be signed and certified by the magistrate when reduced to writing 
by him, or under his direction, and when taken down in shorthand, the transcript 
I the stenographer appointed as aforesaid, when written out in longhand, and 
ertined as being a correct statement of such testimony and procedings in the case, 
:phall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings. The 
tenographer shall, if the defendant is held to answer the charge, within ten days 
•fter the close of such examination, transcribe his said shorthand notes into long-
and, and certify and file the same with the clerk of the district court of the 
unty in which the defendant shall have been examined, and shall in all cases 
e his original notes with said clerk. The stenographer's fees shall be paid out 
f the treasury of the county. [C. L. § 4883*. 
' Cal Pen. C. \ 869*. thereby, and did not ask for a continuance in order 
Failure of reporter to file transcript does not pre- to secure same. People v. Thiede, 11 U. 241; 89 P . 
nt defendant from being brought to trial where 837. Affirmed, Thiede v. People, 159 tJ. S. 510, 
pendant did not claim that he was prejudiced 
4671. Custody and disposition of depositions, etc. The magistrate 
if his clerk must keep the depositions taken, and exhibits admitted as evidence 
n the examination, until they shall be returned to the proper court; and must 
t>t permit them to be examined or copied by any person except a judge of a court 
ving jurisdiction of the offense, or authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
e attorney general, county attorney, or other prosecuting attorney, and the 
efendant and his counsel. [C. L. § 4884. 
Cal. Pen. C \ 870. 
4672. Id. Violation of preceding section a crime. Every violation 
the last section is punishable as a misdemeanor. 
*•.!?. Dak. (1895^ §7963. 
4673. Defendant discharged for want of probable cause. If, after 
aring the proofs, it appears that either no public offense has been committed, or 
at there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public offense, 
% e magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, by an indorsement 
n the warrant or the complaint, signed by him, to the following effect: " There 
eing no sufficient cause to believe the within named A. B guilty of the offense 
fchin mentioned, I order him discharged." [C. L. § 4885*. 
Cal. Pen. C. \ 871. 
4674. Id. When costs taxed against complainant. If the defendant 
n.a preliminar}^ examination for a public offense is discharged as provided in the 
evious section, and if the magistrate finds that the prosecution was malicious 
r without probable cause, he shall enter such judgment on his docket and tax 
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the costs against the complaining witness, which shall be enforced a6* judgments 
for costs in criminal cases, and execution may issue therefor. 
N Dak (1895) { 7965 
4 6 7 5 . W h e n de fendant he ld t o a n s w e r . Order. If, however, it 
appear from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and that 
there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate 
must indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him, to the following effect: 
' ' I t appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint mentioned (or any 
offense, according to the fact, stating generally the nature thereof), has been 
committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within named A B 
guilty thereof, I order that he be held to answer to the same." [C L § 4886*. 
Cal Pen C §872" 
4 6 7 6 . Id. Order w h e n offense n o t ba i lab le . If the offense is not 
bailable, the following words, or words to the same effect, must be added to the 
indorsement: "And that he is hereby committed to the sheriff of the county of 
/» [C. L. §4887. 
Cal Pen C $ 873 
4 6 7 7 . Id. Order w h e n b a i l h a s b e e n t a k e n . If the offense is bail-
able, and bail is taken by the magistrate, the following words must be added to 
the aforementioned indorsement: "And I have admitted him to bail to answer by 
the undertaking hereto annexed." [C. L. §4888. 
4 6 7 8 . Id. Order w h e n offense ba i lab le . If the offense is bailable 
and the defendant is admitted to bail, but bail shall not have been given, the fol-
lowing words must be added to the order indorsed on the complaint: "And that 
he is admitted to bail in the sum of dollars, and is committed to the sheriff 
of the county of , until he gives such bail, or is legally discharged.'1 [C. L. 
§ 4889. 
Cal Pen C i 875' Bail, £j> 4983-5010 
4 6 7 9 . C o m m i t m e n t t o be de l ivered w i t h defendant . I t the magis-
trate orders the defendant to be committed, he must make out a commitment, 
signed by himself, with his name of office, and deliver it, with the defendant, to 
the officer to whom he is committed, or, if that officer is not present, to a peace 
officer, who must immediately deliver the defendant into the proper custody, 
together with the commitment. [C. L. § 4890. 
Cal Pen C £876 
4 6 8 0 . Id. F o r m of. The commitment must be to the following effect^ 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
COUNTY OF . J 
The state of Utah to the sheriff of the county of : 
An order having been this day made by me that A B be held to answer upon, 
a charge of (stating briefly the nature of the offense, and giving as near as may 
be the time when and the place where the same was committed), you are com-* 
manded to receive him into your custody and detain him until he is legally 
discharged. 
Dated at , this day of , 18 [C. L. § 4891. 
Cal. Pen C i 877 
4 6 8 1 . W i t n e s s e s m a y b e r e q u i r e d t o g i v e b o n d s . On holding the' 
defendant to answer, the magistrate may take from each of the 'material wit-J 
nesses examined before him on the part of the state a written undertakings 
without surety, to the effect that he will appear and testify at the court to which 
the complaint and depositions are to be sent, or that he will forfeit the sum ofl 
two hundred dollars. [C. L. § 4892. 
Cal. Pen. C. i 878* 
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4 6 8 2 . Id. Suret ies m a y be required. When the magistrate or a 
judge of the court in which the action is pending shall be satisfied, by proof on 
oath, that there is reason to believe that any such witness will not appear and 
testify unless security is required, he may order the witness to enter into a 
written undertaking, with sureties, in such sum as he may deem proper, for his 
appearance as specified in the last section. [C. L. § 4893. 
Cal Pen C $ 879 
4 6 8 3 . Id. W h e n w i t n e s s i s a minor. When a minor is a material wit-
ness, any other person may be allowed to give an undertaking for the appearance 
of such witness; or the magistrate may, in his discretion, take the undertaking of 
such minor in a sum not exceeding fifty dollars, which shall be valid and binding 
in law, notwithstanding the disability of minority. 
Mont Pen C $ 1690* 
4 6 8 4 . Id. C o m m i t m e n t for fa i lure t o g ive . If a witness, required 
to enter into an undertaking to appear and testify, either with or without sureties, 
refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, the magistrate must commit 
him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged. [C. L. § 4894. 
Cal Pen C i 881. 
4 6 8 5 . E x a m i n a t i o n of w i t n e s s u n a b l e t o g i v e bond . When, how-
ever, it shall satisfactorily appear, by examination on oath of the witness, or any 
other person, that the witness is unable to procure sureties, he may be forthwith 
conditionally examined on behalf of the state. Such examination must be by 
question and answer, in the presence of the defendant, or after notice to him, if 
on bail, and conducted in the same manner as the examination before a com-
mitting magistrate is required by this code to be conducted, and the witness must 
thereupon be discharged; but this section shall not apply to an accomplice in 
the commission of the offense charged. [C. L. § 4895. 
Cal. Pen. C. £ 882 Use of such testimony, 4 4513 
4686. Magistrate must return papers to district court. When a 
magistrate shall have discharged a defendant, or shall have held him to answer, 
he must return without delay, to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is 
required to appear, the warrant if any, the complaint, the depositions if any, a 
list of the names and the postoffice addresses of all witnesses for the state, if he 
can ascertain them, and all undertakings of bail and for the appearance of wit-
nesses taken b}' him, together with a certified copy of the record of the proceed-
ings as it appears on his docket. [C. L. § 4896; '96, p. 312. 
Cal. Pen. C. $ 883* 
4687. When defendant a convict. Examination in prison. When 
Dhe defendant is a convict in the state prison, or a prisoner in a county jail, the 
Examination may be held in the office of the prison or jail. I n such cases the 
commitment shall be directed to the warden of the prison or to the keeper of 
the jail. ['96, p. 271*. 
CHAPTER 17 . 
PROSECUTION BY INFORMATION, INDICTMENT, OR ACCUSATION. 
4 6 8 8 . P r o s e c u t i o n s in distr ict cour t t o b e b y informat ion , etc . 
&11 public offenses triable in the district courts, except cases appealed from justices' 
courts, must be prosecuted by information or indictment, except as provided in 
the next section. [C. L. § 4897*. 
Cal Pen C b 8B8y,\ 
Prosecution by information or indictment, Con. a i t . 1, bee 13, | 4509. 
